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CHANGING CONCERN FOR U. S. NATIONAL SECURITY.

Charles William Lawing

NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL
Monterey, California

THESIS

CHANGING CONCERN FOR U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY

by

Charles William Lawing

June 1978

Thesis Advisor: Donald C. Daniel

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Changing Concern for U.S. National Security

by

Charles William Lawing
Lieutenant, United States Navy
B.S., Millikin University, 1968

Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of

MASTER OF ARTS IN NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

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ABSTRACT

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I. INTRODUCTION

The freedom and safety of all Americans, as well as the American way of life, has always been a function of U.S. national security. But, continuing interest in national security affairs is a relative newcomer to the list of major American concerns. Prior to World War II, U.S. national security was virtually guaranteed by its geographic isolation from the European center of military and political power. Since major threats to U.S. security were relatively few and far between and the U.S. was never subjected to the invasion, devastation, and destruction that Europe had experienced over the years, America developed a tradition whereby interest in national security affairs and support for the military was greatest only during time of war, when the threat was readily identifiable.

That tradition was, however, changed by the outcome of World War II. While the U.S. had emerged from the war as the world's dominant military power and political leader of the free world, the Soviet Union emerged as the dominant power in Eurasia, when the traditional European and world powers were virtually destroyed. As the war ended, the U.S. moved toward its traditional peacetime deemphasis of the military, since the nation once again seemed secure from external threats. But, at the same time a new threat emerged, as the Soviet Union shifted from wartime ally to "peacetime" adversary. Although the overrunning of Eastern Europe, the coup in

Czechoslovakia, and the Berlin blockade signaled the start of the Cold War, the Korean conflict reinforced the reality of the communist threat to not only Europe and Asia, but ultimately the United States. Additionally, the potential threat posed by the Soviet Union breaking the U.S. nuclear weapon monopoly and developing delivery systems which could bring the devastation of war to the U.S. homeland, negated the historical geographic advantage and added a new dimension to the threat to U.S. national security.

The Cold War dominated the military-political arena from the late 1940s through the early 1960s and facilitated the transformation of American attitudes to an unprecedented level of "peacetime" concern for national security affairs and support for the military. Although both the political and military threats were heavily emphasized and Premier Khrushchev became well known for his boastful, saber-rattling speeches, the decade of the 1950s was not only free of war that threatened U.S. security, but also highly prosperous for the U.S. By the fall of 1962, communist foreign policy initiatives had failed in the Congo and Indonesia and the Cuban Missile Crisis had served to highlight Soviet military inferiority vis-a-vis the U.S.

Having apparently solved the military problem and effectively contained the communist threat, the U.S. began to turn increasingly inward to domestic problems and issues. By the late 1960s, U.S. involvement in Southeast Asia and the apparent decrease in the perceived threat to U.S. national security

precipitated an increasing dissatisfaction with defense policies and a growing demand to reorder national priorities. While this was in effect a rejection of the previous decade's unprecedented growth of military power and influence and a call to return to the traditional peacetime deemphasis of national security affairs and the military, it is ironic that it occurred as the Soviet Union made its most significant strides toward closing the gap between U.S. and Soviet military power. By the mid-1970s the military balance began to be seriously questioned and in 1976, former Secretary of Defense James R. Schlesinger noted that for too many Americans, national security had become accepted as a given state of nature. He went on to add that the current threat to U.S. and world security is more serious than at any time since the 1930s.

> ... the military balance is deteriorating, but the trend in large goes unnoticed because the Soviets today, though expansion minded, speak in less bombastic and threatening terms than the Nazis did (Ref. 1, p. 75).

Figure 1 shows four commonly used measures which clearly indicate that the relative priority given national security has decreased since 1950, but has absolute concern also decreased?



Figure 1: National Defense; as a percentage of

Source: Clayton (Ref. 2, p. 367)

Was Sir John Slessor anticipating the American attitude of the late 1960s and 1970s when he remarked that "there is a tendency to forget that the most important social service that a government can do for its people is to keep them alive and free"? (Ref. 3, p. 650). Can concern be measured? What are the indicators? What are the trends?

A. THESIS OBJECTIVE

The objective of this thesis is to attempt to answer these questions. It is an exploratory attempt at categorizing, correlating, and explaining trends in presidential, Congressional, and public concern for U.S. national security over

the period from 1950 through 1977. It also links trends in concern with the development of U.S. military forces and capabilities.

B. THE FOLLOWING CHAPTERS

Chapter II discusses Congressional concern for national security based on Congress' "power of the purse." The primary focus of the chapter is on changes in Congressional defense appropriations, but two alternative measures are also discussed, since defense appropriations do not include all the activities which can be or are commonly related to national security.

Presidential concern is dealt with in Chapter III. Although it is usually unstated, the underlying presidential concern must be the maintenance of national security in order to ensure national sovereignty and the American way of life. The President's concern for national security is articulated for the benefit of both foreign and domestic audiences in formal presentations. Two of those presentations, the annual State of the Union Message and the defense budget request, are discussed as indicators of presidential concern over time.

Chapter IV focusses on possible indicators of public concern. Since public opinion is difficult to identify, much less measure, this is a difficult problem area to deal with. Although the public opinion polls have limitations and there is no consistently asked question which directly taps the public concern for national security over time, these polls are the best source available. The measures discussed in this

chapter include the number and type of questions asked by the Gallup Poll over the period, the national security related responses to the "most important problem" question, and the public attitude toward defense spending. Some of the recent specialized polls and research efforts are also discussed as a substantiating measure and an alternative approach to measuring public concern for national security.

Chapter V is an explanatory analysis of what the President has recommended that the nation do and what the Department of Defense has done, in terms of developing military capabilities to counter the perceived threat to U.S. national security. This chapter helps to explain the major changes in presidential, Congressional, and public concern for U.S. national security over the 1950-1977 period. The presidential portion is based on the national security remarks from the State of the Union Messages, while the DOD portion is based on changes in force structure and service and program emphasis.

The individual conclusions and findings from Chapters II through V are then brought together in Chapter VI as a concluding explanation of the trends and major changes in American concern for national security.

II. CONGRESSIONAL CONCERN

The objective of this chapter is to develop and discuss an indicator of Congressional concern for national security that can later be compared with indicators of presidential and public concern in Chapter VI. Although there is no standard measure available, since Congress holds the "power of the purse" and ultimately decides the allocation of funds to all federally supported probrams, the output of the Congressional budgetary process, Congressional appropriations, can be viewed as an indicator of Congressional concern. Specific program appropriations are a function of national policies and priorities and dependent on the assessment of how the political, economic, and military capabilities and intentions of other nations, friend or foe, affect U.S. freedom and safety. Congressional concern for national security should, therefore, be reflected by changes in national security related appropriations. All other things being equal, defense related appropriations should normally change (increase or decrease) when the perceived threat to and the associated concern for national security affairs changes (increases or decreases).

While it may be generally agreed that Congressional appropriations for national security related activities are indicative of Congressional concern, it should be noted that there is no agreed upon method or measure of what activities or appropriations should be included under the title of

national security affairs. For that reason and even though the primary focus of this chapter is on Congressional defense appropriations, two alternative measures, the U.S. budget "national defense" account and the Joint Economic Committee of the Congress' (JEC) proposed "national security" account, are also discussed.

A. APPROPRIATIONS, DEFENSE, AND SECURITY

Of the three measures discussed herein, Congressional defense appropriations represent the narrowest definition of the cost of national security. These appropriations are the product of the Congressional Defense Appropriations Bill, which delineates the upper limit to which the Department of Defense can commit or obligate federal funds during the upcoming fiscal year for military personnel, operations and maintenance, procurement, and research, development, test, and evaluation (RDT&E). It does not include military construction, which is considered under separate legislation.

The U.S. budget "national defense" account is a somewhat broader definition of the cost of national security. This account includes Congressional defense appropriations plus military assistance payments from the "international affairs" account, military atomic energy development and production costs,[1] stockpiling, selective service, and numerous minor

---

[1]Prior to fiscal year 1976, all atomic energy development and production costs were included in the "national defense" account. Since that time, civilian nuclear energy development and production costs have been included under the "energy" account.

defense related costs, minus offsetting receipts from activities such as foreign military sales. The JEC's proposed "national security" account is one of the broadest definitions of the cost of national security. This method would further add all veterans' benefits, all space and related research costs, 75% of the interest on the national debt, more items from the "international affairs" account, expenses associated with the U.S. Arms and Disarmament Agency, the National Security Council, and impacted area school aid, as well as a number of other minor defense related costs (Ref. 2, p. 365).

It is therefore apparent that Congressional defense appropriations are only part of the total cost of national security and that one must be aware of the definitions used and activities included when discussing the cost of national security. Figure 2, which is based on data contained in Appendix A, shows the 1950-1977 trends for all three accounting methods. It must be pointed out that since the JEC data is not available for the entire period under study, the "national security" account figures used herein are an approximation of the JEC data.[2] The information provided by Figure 2 indicates that:

(1) the different definitions yield significantly different dollar totals; however,

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[2]The JEC approximation used herein was calculated by adding the DOD and the Veterans, Space and International expenditure categories and 75% of the Interest category for each of the years between 1950 and 1977 (Ref. 4, p. C-10).



Figure 2. The Cost of National Security: 1950-1977

(2) the overall trends are essentially the same over time, regardless of which definition is used.

Although there are some slight variations, due to the comparison of appropriations and expenditures, they are not significant enough to negate the use of Congressional defense appropriations as a measure of Congressional concern for U.S. national security over time.

B. REQUIRED CORRECTIONS

Figure 2 clearly indicates that the absolute cost of national security has generally increased since 1950. This figure is not, however, an adequate representation of the real cost of national security or Congressional concern over time, since it is based on current dollar data. While current dollar figures are relevant to price structure which exists at a given time, in order to compare costs over time, the data must be converted to constant purchasing power to eliminate the impact of inflation. Additionally, since the concern being measured herein is for U.S. national security, the appropriations must also be corrected for the impact of U.S. military involvement in Southeast Asia.

1. The Impact of Inflation

In order to eliminate the impact of inflation, current dollar figures must be converted or deflated into constant purchasing power. There are currently a number of different kinds of deflators available, since there is no ideal or perfect way to correct for inflation. There is, however, as of February 1978, no appropriate price deflator for the purchase

of military goods and services.[3] The current DOD procedure is to deflate the purchase of goods and services based on the "federal purchases" deflator of the Department of Commerce and military pay and allowances by a separate deflator. Since the exact DOD deflators were not available for this research, the "federal purchases" deflator was used to deflate Congressional defense appropriations, even though those appropriations include both purchases of goods and services and military pay. It is, however, estimated that, since the deflators vary only in degree and not magnitude, that the difference between the actual DOD deflated data and the "federal purchases" approximation is not significant enough to alter the overall deflated data trends.

Figure 3 shows a comparison of the current dollar and "federal purchases" deflated Congressional appropriations for the 1950-1976 period. The information provided by this figure indicates that:

(1) except for 1951, 1969, 1972, and 1973, the current and constant dollar trends are essentially the same, even though inflation has affected the magnitude of the annual changes;

(2) the apparent Congressional appropriations increases in 1951, 1969, 1972, and 1973 were negated by the impact of inflation:

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[3]The Departments of Defense and Commerce are currently developing a deflator which is based on the DOD's experience and that deflator should be available in calendar year 1978 (Ref. 4, p. 318).



Figure 3. Current and Constant Dollar Appropriations

(3) current dollar increases since 1972 have been significantly reduced by inflation; and

(4) constant dollar purchasing power in 1974, 1975, and 1976 was at a lower level than at any time since the 1959-1961 period.

2. The Impact of Southeast Asia

The impact of U.S. involvement in Southeast Asia is not only more difficult to correct for than inflation, but it is also a very controversial subject. The actual cost of that involvement is still largely undetermined and there are no accurate records of how much money was requested, appropriated, or expended. Although the Johnson administration included estimated and actual Southeast Asia expenditures in the FY 1966 through 1969 budget presentations, President Nixon chose to obscure the cost of Vietnam by including it in the overall "national defense" account. It is interesting to note that the House Defense Appropriations Subcommittee told a Boston Globe reporter in 1975 that an accurate or total figure was "hard to get a handle on" because of "sloppy bookkeeping" (Ref. 5, p. 847).

For purposes of this research, the estimated incremental costs compiled by the Department of Commerce (Ref. 6, p. 326) are assumed to be approximately equal to what was requested, appropriated, and expended for military operations in Southeast Asia. These incremental cost figures reflect the estimated costs which were incurred over and above the normal peacetime costs of operating a baseline force. While

this correction factor is admittedly not totally accurate, it does attempt to take into account the approximately $110 billion which was expended by the DOD in Southeast Asia between 1965 and 1976.

Figure 4, based on data contained in Appendix A, shows the 1950-1976 Congressional defense appropriations trends in constant dollars with and without the estimated appropriations for Southeast Asia. The information provided by this figure indicates that:

(1) the overall trend since 1965 is substantially different if the estimated Southeast Asia appropriations are excluded;

(2) the appropriations related to U.S. national security decreased significantly between 1963 and 1967; and

(3) although there was an increase in 1968, the appropriations for U.S. national security between 1968 and 1976 were lower than at any time since 1960.

C. THE CORRECTED DATA

The data presented in this chapter indicate that the absolute cost of national security (Figure 2) has shown a general increasing tendency since after the Korean War peak. They have also shown that the current dollar trends are not representative of the real cost of Congressional concern for U.S. national security, unless corrected for the impact of inflation and U.S. military involvement in Southeast Asia. After applying those corrections, the data are not only more representative of Congressional concern for U.S. national security,



Figure 4. The Estimated Impact of Southeast Asia (Constant dollars)

but also more revealing. The final indicator of Congressional concern, as measured by the corrected Congressional defense appropriations (Figure 4) indicates that Congressional concern:

(1) hit a significant peak during the Korean War, but also showed an approximate 100% net increase between 1951 and 1955;

(2) increased somewhat in 1956 and 1957, but decreased in 1958;

(3) increased sharply in 1959 and leveled off in 1960 and 1961;

(4) increased sharply in 1962, leveled off, and subsequently decreased significantly between 1964 and 1967; and

(5) increased sharply in 1968, but has fluctuated up and down since that time, with the most recent trend being upward since 1974.

While these individual changes are not considered in-depth until all measures are brought together in Chapter VI, it is significant to note that the major changes in Congressional concern appear to occur relative to major historical events. Figure 5 shows the overall constant dollar, Southeast Asia corrected indicator of Congressional concern and some of the major historic events which occurred during the 1950-1976 period.

The 1951-1954 Korean War peak is undoubtedly the most notable feature of the graph; however the net increases of approximately $28 billion between 1951 and 1955 and $20 billion between 1955 and 1963, and the decrease of almost $22 billion between 1963 and 1967 are also noteworthy. It is also



Figure 5. Congressional Concern: 1950-1976

significant to note that the Soviet explosion of a hydrogen bomb, the "bomber gap," the launch of sputnik, the "missile gap," the Berlin crisis, and a change of presidents all occurred before or during the 1955 to 1963 increase, and that the Cuban Missile Crisis preceded the 1963-1967 decrease. The increase in 1968 and the oscillations since that time are, however, not as easily associated with historic events. Even though the incremental costs of Southeast Asia were subtracted, it is likely that some of the 1968 and subsequent appropriations were required to reconstitute or equip CONUS or European forces which were drawn down during the massive Vietnam buildup. The oscillations since 1968 are probably related to the need to correct some of the deficiencies caused by neglect during Vietnam and also the uncertainty as to the real nature and impact of the Soviet Union's most recent military developments.

D. CONCLUSION

While the individual periods of increasing and decreasing concern will be further discussed in Chapter VI, it seems reasonable to draw some general conclusions about Congressional concern at this time. The data indicate that Congressional concern, as measured by Congressional defense appropriations, is not static and has varied considerably over the 1950-1976 period. Aside from the Korean War peak, Congressional concern generally increased between 1950 and 1963 and the significant increases may relate to historic events such as the Soviet explosion of an H-bomb, the "bomber gap," sputnik, the "missile

gap," international tension, such as the Berlin crisis and a change of presidents. There was a notable decrease in Congressional concern after the Cuban Missile Crisis and although that concern subsequently increased in 1968, it has fluctuated since that time. Even though the most recent trend has been upward since 1974, the level in 1976 was still below that of any year since 1960.

E. AN ADDITIONAL NOTE ON CONGRESSIONAL DEFENSE APPROPRIATIONS

While Congressional defense appropriations provide a useful means of measuring the major changes in Congressional concern for purposes of this research, it should be noted that Congress has not always been an independent creator of defense dollars. Table I shows the Congressional changes to the defense budget requests between fiscal years 1950 and 1977. The information provided by these data indicates that:

(1) except for fiscal years 1953, 1954, 1958, and 1962, there was no functional difference between Congressional defense appropriations and defense budget requests over the eighteen year period from 1950 to 1968; and

(2) Congressional cuts to defense budget requests since FY 1969 have ranged from -3.1% to -7.6% and averaged -5.5%.

These data indicate that the Congress generally "rubber-stamped" the defense budget requests through FY 1968, but not afterwards. Two of the four exceptions during the "rubber-stamp" period, those in fiscal years 1953 and 1954, were probably related to the general reduction of military force levels as the Korean War drew to a stalemate. While the FY 1958

reduction may have been partially due to Congressional election eve politics, it is probably more indicative of a difference of opinion about the magnitude of the threat in early 1957, prior to the launch of sputnik. The other exception, the increased Congressional appropriation in FY 1962 indicates that Congress thought that more funds should immediately be devoted to countering the "missile gap."

The Congressional cuts since FY 1969 indicate that Congress has assumed a greater role in defense decision making, relative to defense spending. This new Congressional role is indeed significant and is acknowledged for the benefit of the reader.[4] This changing role does not, however, negate the validity of using Congressional defense appropriations as an aggregate measure of Congressional concern for national security in this research.

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[4]An indepth analysis of the changing Congressional role in defense decision making is provided by Laurance (Ref. 7).

Table I. Congressional Changes to Defense Budget Requests

Fiscal Year	Congressional Change Percentage	$Millions
1950	-2.3%	-299
1951	1.6	216
1952	-1.3	-740
1953	-9.3	-4780
1954	-15.6	-6348
1955	-3.6	-1087
1956	-1.1	-350
1957	1.5	509
1958	-6.6	-2368
1959	3.7	1406
1960	-0.05	-20
1961	1.7	662
1962	8.7	3720
1963	0.5	229
1964	-3.7	-1794
1965	-1.5	-719
1966	3.6	1638
1967	0.7	403
1968	-2.3	-1647
1969	-6.8	05204
1970	-7.5	-5638
1971	-3.1	-2150
1972	-4.1	-3025
1973	-6.6	-5221
1974	-4.6	-3536
1975	-5.7	-4961
1976	-7.6	-7391
1977	-3.4	-3621

III. PRESIDENTIAL CONCERN

The President is concerned with national security affairs not only as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, but also as Chief of State and head of the government. As part of his duties he seeks to persuade the people that what he wants to do is congruent with their best interests. This includes the full spectrum of national programs, policies, and goals, ranging from domestic social and economic policies aimed at improving the overall quality of life to national security programs, which produce no tangible benefits.

The President's concern for national security is articulated in both formal and informal channels. The formal channels include his inaugural address and the annual state of the union and budget presentations. The informal channels include press conferences, statements, speeches, and press releases which are largely oriented toward clarifying or justifying policies or maintaining and mobilizing public support. There are of course limits as to what can be said in these unclassified channels and therefore not all national security matters can be enunciated in public. However, these channels provide an important means by which the President can appraise the Congress, the American people, and foreign nations, friend and foe, of the why and wherefore of U.S. national policy and capabilities. Of all these sources, the annual state of the union and budget presentations probably provide the most comprehensive, regularly-recurring, documentation of presidential concern. The State of the Union

Messages are used to develop a measure of expressed presidential concern, while the defense budget requests provide a measure of overall concern, whether expressed or not.

Since this analysis is based on these required, formal, presidential presentations, it does not consider the special national security related speeches or presentations, such as President Nixon's State of the World Messages.[5] These annual (1969-1973) Nixon presentations are, however, mentioned here to alert the reader to a possible alternative expression of President Nixon's concern for U.S. national security. Although this alternative is acknowledged, it is not considered herein due to the design of this research and focus on the State of the Union Message.

A. THE STATE OF THE UNION

Since the state of the union presentation provides an annual review of the major problems, including national security, facing the nation, it can be used to develop an indicator of expressed presidential concern for national security over time. The indicator developed in this chapter is based solely on the portion of the message devoted to national security

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[5]In addition to Nixon's State of the World Messages of January 30, 1969, February 18, 1970, February 25, 1971, February 9, 1972 and May 3, 1973; President Kennedy presented special messages on the proposed defense budget increase on March 28, 1961 and urgent national needs on May 25, 1961; and President Eisenhower presented special messages on defense reorganization on April 30, 1953 and the draft and military retention on January 13, 1955.

affairs and not the actual textual remarks. Those remarks are admittedly relevant to the final analysis and are addressed in Chapter V.

It should be noted at the outset that although the State of the Union Message is an annual presentation, there is no standard format and the messages differ widely in style and content from president to president. A list of the messages considered in this analysis is contained in Appendix B. It should be noted that in 1953 both Presidents Truman and Eisenhower and in 1961 both Presidents Eisenhower and Kennedy made separate state of the union presentations. In both cases, the message of the incoming President was used since that of the incumbent was largely oriented toward recapping the accomplishments of his administration. However, the 1969 message of President Johnson was used, since the incoming president did not make a state of the union presentation. Additionally, since President Nixon never delivered the defense segment of the 1973 series of state of the union presentations, there is no data available for 1973.

1. Developing the Measures

The measures discussed herein are based on the total number and relative percentage of paragraphs and column inches devoted to national security in the State of the Union Messages between 1950 and 1977. Two different defintions of what constitutes presidential concern for national security were used to produce four separate, but interrelated measures. The broad definition included presidential reference to either the

military capabilities or threat posed by foreign nations, U.S. defense policies, capabilities, or requirements, arms control and disarmament, and the need for or status of collective security. Specific reference to the political threat of communism was not included, except where associated with collective or mutual security. References to the military problems and policies in Korea were included, since they were usually tied to the need for collective security and U.S. national security. References to the military situation in Southeast Asia were not included, since the texts of the Vietnam era messages indicated that that situation was addressed separately from remarks pertaining to U.S. national security. The other definition of presidential concern is much narrower in scope and included only references to actions or developments which the president indicated were required to counter the threat to U.S. national security.

Using these definitions, presidential concern was then measured by determining the number and percentage of paragraphs and the number and percentage of column inches devoted to each definition of national security. When counting paragraphs, all were counted equally regardless of length. While the paragraph lengths did vary from president to president and sometimes from speech to speech, the overall pattern within a given speech was fairly consistent. After counting the total number of paragraphs and determining the total column inches in a given message, the message was then read to determine the number of paragraphs devoted to the broad definition of national

security. A second reading then determined which paragraphs, if any, were related to action(s) required definition. The appropriate paragraphs were then measured to determine the column inches devoted to each definition. The resultant total numbers are listed in Table II and the associated percentages in Table III.

It should be pointed out that the paragraph measure was the primary objective of this section and that the column inch measure is largely used as a check on the accuracy of counting paragraphs. The total numbers and percentage variations are used herein to check the difference between the total concern for national security over time and the relative concern when considered within the context of all issues which needed to be addressed. The total numbers or absolute measures are to some degree a function of the style and especially the overall wordiness of the entire message, but they tend to counteract the problems encountered when there are a large number of issues to be addressed in a given message and only a limited space or time available. The percentage measures, on the other hand, compensate for the overall wordiness of the messages, but not the problems associated with the total number of issues addressed.

2. Measures of Presidential Concern

Figure 6 shows a graphic comparison of the total or absolute measures, paragraphs and column inches, of presidential concern for national security. The information provided by this figure indicates that:

Table II. Absolute Measures of Presidential Concern for National Security

	Paragraphs Devoted to			Column Inches Devoted to		
	Total	National Security	Action(s) Required	Total	National Security	Action(s) Required
1950	82	2	9	166.1	4.1	0
1951	108	41	7	136.9	57.0	8.4
1952	117	34	7	175.3	62.4	11.9
1953	157	27	2	240.7	44.9	4.6
1954	105	17	7	218.3	42.3	14.9
1955	133	23	9	252.0	51.3	19.1
1956	124	13	5	283.5	35.6	13.5
1957	70	9	1	143.0	22.8	1.2
1958	137	53	12	171.1	77.4	13
1959	128	38	0	200.0	50.2	0
1960	112	11	0	199.3	24.9	0
1961	68	11	4	176.2	32.5	12
1962	100	10	1	224.7	22.8	2.7
1963	80	13	2	179.1	33.5	4.8
1964	51	3	0	105.3	8.0	0
1965	174	4	0	158.1	5.6	0
1966	149	4	0	195.4	3.4	0
1967	185	5	0	446.2	15.9	0
1968	168	4	0	322.0	12.4	0
1969	111	3	0	251.5	10.7	0
1970	133	6	0	292.2	12.1	0
1971	120	0	0	292.9	0	0
1972	240	14	4	1129.1	78	20.8
1973[1]	--	--	-	--	--	--
1974	89	6	2	322.1	26.3	6.7
1975	77	4	0	180.2	10.4	0
1976	156	10	3	211.1	14.7	4.8
1977	100	19	7	188.9	36.5	9.4

[1]No Message on Defense

Table III. Percentage Measures of Presidential Concern for National Security

Calendar Year	Percentage of Message Devoted to National Security		Percentage of Message Devoted to Action(s) Required	
	Paragraphs	Column Inches	Paragraphs	Column Inches
1950	2.4%	2.5%	0%	0%
1951	37.9	41.6	6.5	6.1
1952	29.1	35.6	6.0	6.8
1953	17.2	18.7	1.3	1.9
1954	16.2	19.4	6.7	6.8
1955	17.3	20.4	6.8	7.6
1956	11.3	12.6	4.0	4.8
1957	11.4	16.0	1.4	0.8
1958	38.7	45.1	8.8	7.6
1959	29.7	25.1	0	0
1960	10.7	14.1	0	0
1961	13.2	14.1	5.9	6.8
1962	9.0	8.9	1.0	1.2
1963	10.0	12.3	2.5	2.7
1964	3.9	6.8	0	0
1965	2.3	3.5	0	0
1966	2.0	2.3	0	0
1967	2.2	3.3	0	0
1968	2.4	3.9	0	0
1969	2.7	4.3	0	0
1970	5.3	3.8	0	0
1971	0	0	0	0
1972	5.8	6.9	1.7	1.8
1973[1]	--	--	-	-
1974	6.7	8.2	2.2	2.1
1975	5.2	5.8	0	0
1976	8.3	7.2	1.9	2.3
1977	19.0	19.3	7.0	5.0

[1]No Message on Defense



Figure 6. Absolute Measures of Presidential Concern for National Security

(1) the president expressed the most concern for national security from 1951 through 1963 and again in 1972 and 1977; and

(2) expressed comparatively less concern in 1950, from 1964 through 1971, and between 1974 and 1976.

It should be noted that since these absolute measures are related to the overall wordiness of the message, some of the significant peaks may be due to the increased length of the individual message. The apparently significant increase in 1972 is, for example, at least partially due to the increased length of the 1972 message, which was almost twice the mean paragraph length and four times the mean column inch length.

Figure 7 is a comparison of the relative or percentage measures of presidential concern for national security. These measures compensate for the overall wordiness of a given message by expressing presidential concern for national security as a percentage of the total message. The information provided by this figure indicates that:

(1) the president expressed the most concern for national security from 1951 through 1963 and again in 1977; and

(2) comparatively less concern from 1964 through 1976.

While both the total and percentage measures show that there was an increase in 1972, the percentage measure suggests that total measure increase was largely due to the increased length of that message.

Figures 8 and 9 show the total and percentage measures, for both paragraphs and column inches, for the presidential



Figure 7. Percentage Measures of Presidential Concern for National Security

concern for action(s) required. As with the broader definition, the percentage measure of action(s) required, corrects for the wordiness of individual messages, with 1972 again being the most notable case. While these figures show that the president was more concerned prior to 1963 than afterwards, they also show that the president has not always indicated that new or renewed initiatives were required to counter the threat to U.S. national security. Figures 8 and 9 indicate that:

(1) presidential concern was at essentially a baseline level in 1950, 1959-1960, 1964 through 1971, and in 1975;

(2) at a somewhat higher level in 1953, 1957, 1962-1963, 1972, 1974, and 1976; and

(3) at its highest level in 1951-1952, 1954-1955, 1958, 1961, and 1977.

3. Selecting One Measure

The data presented thus far indicate that regardless of whether presidential concern is considered in absolute or percentage terms, the national security and action(s) required measures indicate that:

(1) the president expressed the greatest concern for national security from 1951 through 1963, with notable peaks in 1951-1952, 1954-1955, 1958, and 1961;

(2) expressed comparatively less concern between 1964 and 1971; and

(3) has expressed increased concern since 1972, with notable peaks or increases in 1972, 1976, and 1977.



Figure 8. Absolute Measures of Presidential Concern for Action(s) Required



Figure 9. Percentage Measures of Presidential Concern for Action(s) Required

However, if the difference between the national security and action(s) required definitions is taken into account, the data are somewhat more revealing, since the rhetoric associated with national security is eliminated. The difference between the two measures also indicates that the President generally devotes some portion of the State of the Union Messages to national security, even if no new or renewed action(s) is required to counter the threat to U.S. national security. These differences indicate that the action(s) required measure is probably more representative of presidential concern for national security over time and the action(s) required graphs in Figures 8 and 9 indicate that the President:

(1) expressed the greatest concern for U.S. national security from 1951 through 1963 and since 1972, with notable peaks in 1951-1952, 1954-1955, 1958, 1961, and 1977 and less concern during the other years during these periods; and

(2) comparatively little concern from 1964 through 1971.

The various measures of presidential concern show essentially the same trends over time; however, since the action(s) required measure is probably most indicative of presidential concern, it will be used in the comparison of presidential, Congressional, and public concern in Chapter VI.

B. DEFENSE BUDGET REQUESTS

The second indicator of presidential concern is aimed at identifying overall presidential concern, whether expressed or not. This indicator is based on the changes in the annual

defense budget request and as in the previous chapter it keys on the logic that, all other things being equal, changes in concern for national security should be reflected in changes in defense budget requests as well as Congressional appropriations. While some might argue that the defense budget request is actually the DOD's and not the president's request, it should be noted that the DOD is actually constrained by government fiscal policy as determined by the President and his financial staff. The DOD shopping list and budget request would probably be at least somewhat larger if not so constrained.

As discussed in Chapter II, the current dollar figures are neither representative of the real cost nor the real concern for national security over time. For those reasons the defense budget requests must be corrected for the impact of inflation and U.S. military involvement in Southeast Asia before they can be used as an indicator of presidential concern for U.S. national security over time. Since the procedures used for these "federal purchases" deflator and the estimated incremental Southeast Asia costs, are the same as were used to correct the Congressional defense appropriations, they are not discussed in detail herein. However, the data used in this section are included in Appendix B for reference.

Figure 10 shows the constant dollar, Southeast Asia corrected graph of defense budget requests. The information provided by this figure indicates that presidential concern, as measured by defense budget requests:



Figure 10. Corrected Defense Budget Requests

(1) hit a significant peak during the Korean War, but also showed an approximate 100% net increase between 1951 and 1955;

(2) slowly, but steadily increased from 1955 through 1961;

(3) increased sharply in 1962 and 1963, but leveled off in 1964 and decreased significantly between 1965 and 1967; and

(4) increased sharply in 1968, but has fluctuated up and down since that time, with the most recent trend being upward since 1974.

In more general and somewhat oversimplified terms, the defense budget request data indicates that presidential concern can be divided into three fairly distinct periods. Aside from the Korean War peak, the period between 1952 and 1964 is characterized by increasing concern. The period between 1964 and 1967 is characterized by decreased concern and the period since 1968 by fluctuating concern and uncertainty.

C. CONCLUDING REMARKS

It is somewhat unrealistic to attempt to compare the year-to-year changes of the action(s) required and defense budget request measures, since the expressed concern can vary considerably from year to year, while the changes in budget requests are somewhat constrained. That is to say that there are fiscal and physical limits as to how much could be requested or spent on national security in a given year, regardless of the magnitude

of change in the expressed presidential concern. It is, however, possible to compare the major trends or tendencies as long as the difference in timing between the State of the Union Message and defense budget request is considered. Since the fiscal year actually begins prior to the calendar year, the budget for fiscal year 1960, for example, went into effect 1 July 1959 and the FY 1960 budget request was based on essentially the same historical data base as the 1959 State of the Union Message. Therefore, the State of the Union Message for given year (x) should be compared with defense budget request for fiscal year (x+1).

Figure 11 is a graphic comparison of presidential concern for national security as measured by the constant dollar, Southeast Asia corrected defense budget requests and action(s) required remarks from the State of the Union Messages. It should be noted that the graphs have been adjusted so that the State of the Union Message for year (x) corresponds to the defense budget request for year (x+1) and also that the number scale can only be used to compare the individual trends or graphs and not between graphs. The historical events are provided only as a point of reference and will not be discussed until Chapter VI. The information provided by Figure 11 indicates that:

(1) there was considerable concern for action(s) required from 1951 to 1958, with peaks in 1951-1952, 1954-1955, and 1958 and that defense budget requests increased during that period (FY 1952-FY 1959);



Figure 11. Two Measures of Presidential Concern

(2) there was no expressed concern for action(s) required in 1959-1960 and the corresponding defense budget requests (FY 1960-1961) leveled off;

(3) there was a sharp increase in concern for action(s) required in 1961 and significant increases in the defense budget requests in FYs 1962 and 1963;

(4) concern for action(s) required decreased in a base-line level in 1964 and remained at that level through 1971, while defense budget requests decreased from FY 1965 through FY 1967 and fluctuated up and down since that time; and

(5) the increased concern for actions required in 1972 and 1976 corresponds with increased defense budget requests in FY 1973 and 1977.

This indicates that presidential concern prior to and after 1963 was different and that the president was generally more concerned prior to that time than afterwards. The oscillations in the defense budget requests since the early 1970s, coupled with the increased concern for action(s) required since 1972, further suggests that the president is generally more concerned in the mid 1970s, than he had been between 1964 and 1971. This increased concern of late is highlighted by the fact that the expressed concern for action(s) required in 1977 was approximately as high as it had been in 1951-1952 or 1961, and that 1976-1977 was the only time in the twenty-seven year period when concern for action(s) required increased substantially in two consecutive years, under the same president.

Although somewhat oversimplified, the data indicate that presidential concern for U.S. national security can be summarized as:

(1) at a high level from 1951 through 1963;

(2) at a comparatively low level from 1964 through 1971; and

(3) somewhat uncertain during the early 1970s, but generally increasing since 1975.

IV. PUBLIC CONCERN

The objective of this chapter is to investigate possible measures of public concern for national security. It should be recognized from the outset that public opinion is difficult to identify much less measure, and that there is only one data source, public opinion polls, available over time. While these polls have certain limitations, they are the best means available for measuring public opinion.

There is a considerable volume of public opinion poll data covering numerous topics and questions; however, there is no single question which has consistently and systematically attacked the problem of public concern for national security or national security affairs. For that reason, this chapter is of necessity limited to the more or less indirect measures of public concern. The primary focus is on the national security related responses to the Gallup Poll question about the "most important problem" facing the nation. While this question does not directly tap public concern for national security, it does provide an indication of the public concern and awareness of the international and domestic problems and issues which could potentially affect U.S. national security. In addition to this measure, the type, number, and percentage of national security related questions asked over the period provides an overview of the "newsworthiness" of national security within the context of the issues of the day. The results of some of the specialized polls and the public

attitude toward defense spending are also discussed to substantiate the overall and especially the most recent trends.

A. OVERVIEW MEASURES

Since the pollsters are in the business of measuring public opinion on the issues of the day, the type, number, and percentage of national security related questions asked each year should be indicative of the overall "newsworthiness" and concern for national security, within the context of the major issues of the day. While this sounds like a very straightforward measure, it is somewhat difficult to operationalize, since there is no standard definition of national security affairs. For purposes of this research, a rough measure was created by counting the Gallup Poll questions related to the prospect of war, military preparedness, capabilities, and defense policies of the U.S., its allies, and adversaries, nuclear weapons, civil defense, defense spending, disarmament, and military alliances and commitments. Questions related to crisis situations and areas such as Korea, Berlin and the Middle East were included, however, since Southeast Asia is a case in itself, questions so related were not included. The data for this measure came from the Gallup Poll books, (Ref. 14) which provide an historical recap of that organization's survey questions and responses by newspaper release data through 1971. This measure is limited to the 1950-1971 period because compatible data is not readily available for the 1972-1977 period due to a change in reporting format and switch to monthly indexes.

Figure 12 shows both the number of national security related questions asked each year and that number as a percentage of the total number of questions asked by the Gallup Poll each year between 1950 and 1971. Both measures indicate that national security was a more "newsworthy" issue prior to 1963 than after that time and also that this measure is sensitive to international crises as evidenced by the peaks relative to the Korean War and the Berlin crisis in 1961.

While this "bean counting" indicates that the periods before and after 1963 are different, it is also useful to look at the type of questions asked over the years. Figure 13 shows the major categories of national security related questions which were asked by the American Institute of Public Opinion (Gallup Poll) between 1950 and 1977. This figure shows that although some very direct national security related questions have been asked over the years, that there are some serious time discontinuities with most of them. What the figure does not show is that even within these artificial categories, there are some problems with inconsistencies and incompatibilities in question wording, which would limit the use of these questions in an in-depth analysis over time.

The "war down the road" category, for example, includes questions which asked the respondent whether he thought that there would be war or world war this year, next year, in five years, ten years, twenty-five years, or within his lifetime. The question wording and age of the respondent would certainly affect the response given. The "use nuclear weapons" category



Figure 12. The Number and Percentage of Gallup Poll Questions Related to National Security



Figure 13. Gallup Poll Questions Related to National Security

contains questions which asked the respondent if he thought atomic, hydrogen, or nuclear weapons would be used against his hometown or the U.S., or whether such weapons should be used in a future war against Russia or Red China or in Korea or Vietnam. These problems are further compounded by the lack of an adequate or appropriate methodology for combining related questions to develop a combined indicator.

Figure 13 does, however, indicate that there is a difference in the type of questions asked by the Gallup Poll before and after the early 1960s. Prior to about 1963, the Gallup Organization asked a number of questions related to the possibility of war, the U.S. position in military alliances, and military strength and capabilities. However, the fact that similar questions have not been asked since that time suggests that national security, at least as seen by the Gallup Organization, has been a less significant issue since the early 1960s.

B. THE MOST IMPORTANT PROBLEM

Due to the limits imposed by the public opinion poll data, the primary focus of this chapter is an exploratory attempt at categorizing public concern for national security based on the only question which has been consistently asked over the 1950-1977 period; what is the most important problem facing the nation? While this question does not directly attack the problem of public concern for national security, it is indicative of the public concern and awareness of the

international events or situations and the major U.S. policies or actions, which can have either an immediate or perceived potential effect on the U.S. national security. Since the responses to this question are spontaneous, in that they are not suggested by the interviewer, the most important problem question minimized the "status conferring" effect which often prompts responses to the more direct foreign policy or like questions, which the respondent has either no knowledge of or interest in.[6]

Being spontaneous, the responses are subject to change as current events, the world political and military environment, and U.S. involvement therein changes. The "average" respondent is not likely to be concerned with international events and U.S. national security policy unless he believes that those events or policies can affect him, or his family, friends, or country. Public concern for international events, military policy and preparedness, U.S. foreign involvement, and related areas and activities is likely to increase during a period of increased threat or crisis and decrease during more peaceful times when more attention and energy is devoted to correcting the domestic problems which will improve the overall quality of life.

The data for this section was taken from the reports of the Gallup Poll. Specifics of the poll itself are not

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[6]The Gallup Poll surveys are personal thirty to forty-five minute, in-home interviews conducted by trained interviewers. This is a very unique social situation where the respondent is asked to provide his opinion for posterity. It is to a certain extent, a status conferring opportunity which can prompt a response to very direct and specific questions, which the respondent otherwise has neither knowledge of nor interest in.

addressed herein except to note that it employs scientific polling techniques based on a standard national sample of 1500 to measure the public opinion on the issues of the day in order to satisfy the requirements of the polls over one hundred and fifty subscriber newspapers. Specifics about the poll design and sampling techniques are addressed in Ref. 14, p. v-vii and Ref 15, No. 59, p. 15-23.

1. The Most Important Problem Data

The data consist of the reported responses to sixty most important problem questions which were asked between 1950 and 1977. The historical problem of incompatible and inconsistent question wording was minimized by selecting only the questions which:

(1) dealt with the problems facing the nation or country; and

(2) asked the respondent what he thought, rather than asking him to pick from a given list.

Of the sixty questions selected by this criterion, 48 asked the respondent what he thought was "the most important problem facing the (this) country today?" The total question variants used in this analysis and the number of surveys that were used are listed in Table IV. The specific questions and the national security related responses used in this analysis are contained in Appendix C.

Table IV. Most Important Question Variations

What do you think is the most important problem facing the (this) country today? (48)

What do you think is the most important problem facing this country (2)

What do you think is the most important problem facing the nation today? (2)

What do you consider the most important problem facing the nation today? (1)

In your opinion, what is the most important problem facing the country today? (2)

What do you regard as the biggest problem or issue facing the Government in Washington today? (3)

What do you think is the most important problem facing the entire country today? (1)

If you could sit down and talk with President Eisenhower about any problem facing this country, what problem would you most like to talk about? (1)

The real difficulty with the most important problem question is not in the wording, but in the response reporting. Table V is a summarized list of the major categories into which the Gallup staff lumped the individual responses for reporting purposes. The table shows that a number of different phrases have been used to categorize essentially the same responses and that several responses were often combined into very general categories. This reporting inconsistency militates against following any one response through the entire twenty-seven year period and in effect necessitates the development of a combined value for each survey. It should be noted that Vietnam is included in Table V only to show

Table V. National Security Related Responses

1950	War, threat of war; communism; atomic bomb control.
1951	War and foreign policy, Russia, threats to peace, cold war.
1952	Not asked.
1953	Korean war; peace, avoiding World War III; the draft.
1954	Threat of war, war in Asia, dealing with Russia; communism in U.S.; working out peace; foreign policy problems; H-bomb, national defense.
1955	Foreign policy problems, working out peace, dealing with Russia, Red China; communism in U.S.; defense preparedness.
1956	Threat of war, Suez, foreign policy; communism in U.S.; national defense.
1957	Foreign policy, dealing with Russia; nuclear tests, atomic control; defense preparedness; "sputnik," missiles.
1958	Keeping the peace; Sputnik, space problems; national defense.
1959	Keeping the peace; national defense; "space" problems.
1960	Foreign policy; missile gap, other areas of national defense.
1961	Not asked.
1962	War, peace, international tension.
1963	Cuba, Castro; other international problems, Berlin, Laos, etc.
1964	International problems (Russia--threat of war); foreign affairs.
1965	Vietnam;[1] threat of war; spread of world communism; internal communism.
1966	Vietnam[1]
1969	
1970	Vietnam[1]; international problems (general)
1972	
1973	Other international problems; Vietnam[1]
1974	Foreign affairs; international problems
1977	

[1]Included only to show that Vietnam was generally the most important problem from 1966 into the early 1970s.

that it was the only real national security or international response the Gallup Organization listed between 1966 and 1969 and that it was on the most important problem list from 1965 through 1973. Additionally, since Vietnam is not included in this analysis, there is therefore no data for the period between 1966 and 1969.

Table VI shows the results of adding the various national security related responses in each survey to determine a survey score. The table also lists an annual score which is the authentic average of the survey scores for that year. It should be recalled that these scores are estimated to be a measure of public concern for the international and domestic issues and problems which could affect U.S. national security. While the table shows that there are some significant fluctuations between individual survey scores, this is not unexpected. Since the responses to each survey are spontaneous, the results are subject to change as current events change and are therefore dependent on the combined world and domestic environment at the time the question was asked. Additionally, since the primary focus herein is on the overall trends and major changes over time, the fluctuations between individual surveys is not considered significant.

2. The Most Important Problem Trends

Figure 14 is a graph representation of the annual survey scores for the national security related responses to the most important problem question. The information provides by this figure indicates that:

Table VI. Most Important Problem Scores

Year	Annual Score	Individual Survey Scores
1950	54	March 54
1951	58	September 58
1952	--	no appropriate question
1953	62	January 62
1954	62	March 56, May 68
1955	51.5	June 54, October 49
1956	49.5	September 51, October 48
1957	40.7	May 40, August 43, October 39
1958	40.3	January 50, March 27, September 44
1959	45.7	February 42, April 44, September 51
1960	--	February and June "overwhelming" majority
1961	--	no appropriate question
1962	63	April 63
1963	39	March 53, September 25
1964	43.3	April 41, June 35, August 51, September 46
1965	26.8	March 39, May 28, September 27, Oct-Nov 20, November 20
1966	--	May 13[1], August Vietnam only
1967	--	Vietnam only
1968	--	Vietnam only
1969	--	Vietnam only
1970	14	May 14
1971	8	February 12, June 7, October 5, No November 8
1972	8.8	April 12, June 8, July 5, September 10
1973	12	February 11, May 14, September 11
1974	4	July 4
1975	4.5	Feb-Mar 5, October 4
1976	5	January 5, April 5, October 6
1977	13	May 13

[1]not included in the annual scores



Figure 14. The Most Important Problem Annual Scores

(1) public concern was greatest from 1950 through 1962, with highpoints between 1950 and 1955, and 1959 and 1962;

(2) decreased significantly between 1962 and 1965; and

(3) continued a general decreasing trend through 1974, but increased sharply in 1977. While this measure indicates that public concern was high from 1950 through 1962, decreased during the mid 1960s, and was at a comparatively low level from 1970 through 1977, it is also useful to look at the responses which were associated with the annual survey scores. Figure 15 is a combination of the data from the annual survey scores in Figure 14 and the national security related responses as summarized in Table V. The information provided by Figure 15 indicates that:

(1) the major concerns from 1950 through 1953 were related to the Korean War, the threat of war, and communism;

(2) the threat of war and keeping the peace were major concerns from 1954 through 1960 and defense preparedness or national defense was usually also mentioned;

(3) keeping the peace remained an important concern in the early 1960s and the threat of war and communism were added to the list of concerns in 1965;

(4) Vietnam was the major concern from 1966 through 1969 and remained on the list of concerns through 1973; and

(5) the concern since 1974 has been for foreign relations or international problems.

This data indicates that this measure is sensitive to changes in the world political environment as evidenced by



Figure 15. National Security Related Responses to the Most Important Problem Question

the peaks relative to the Korean War and the late 1950s to early 1960s. It also indicates that sputnik and space were mentioned as problems in the 1957-1959 period, but that historic events did not significantly change overall concern. It is also significant to note that although national defense was often mentioned (eight of seventeen surveys) between 1954 and 1960, it has not been a reported response since that time. Also, six of the surveys conducted between May 1965 and May 1966 reported responses which implied a relationship between the situation in Vietnam, the threat of war, and the threat or spread of world communism. The fact that these responses were not reported after 1966 suggested that the situation in Vietnam was different from that in Korea in the early 1950s, when the threat of war and communism were specified responses not only throughout the war, but also into the immediate post war period. This also suggests that after the initial years of U.S. involvement in Southeast Asia, the public generally disassociated that situation from any threat to U.S. national security.

While the most important problem data do not adequately characterize public concern for national security, they do provide a useful indication of the public concern or awareness for the international and domestic events which could affect U.S. national security. This measure indicates that the public was the most concerned from 1950 through 1962, with high-points relative to the Korean War and the international tension between 1959 and 1962. Concern decreased after 1962 and (aside

from Vietnam) has remained at a comparatively low level since 1970. Since that time, public concern has fluctuated somewhat with the most notable increase in 1977. While this increase may not of itself be significant, it may be an indication that the general decreasing trend may be reversing.

C. THE PUBLIC ATTITUDE TOWARD DEFENSE SPENDING

Another aspect of public opinion which is relevant to this research is the public attitude toward defense spending. Since considerable analysis has already been done in this area, this section will not duplicate previous efforts, but rather draw on them for the historical trends and discuss the most recent poll data. In their analyses of the public opinion toward defense spending, Russett (Ref. 16) and Clotfelter (Ref. 17, p. 137-144) found that:

(1) the popular attitude toward defense spending from 1950 through the mid-1960s was permissive and generally followed the political leadership; and

(2) that a small minority favored reducing the Armed Forces and a somewhat larger minority consistently favored expanding the military or defense expenditures. It should be noted that these conclusions are of necessity general in nature since there is a considerable lack of data points and there are some significant problems due to question wording and bias.[7] These previous works do, however, indicate that

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[7]Defense spending questions were asked in only eight of the eighteen years between 1950 and 1968. Russett (Ref. 16, p. 65-72) discusses the question wording and bias and missing data problems in-depth in his analysis of defense spending.

the public was generally supportive of defense spending from 1950 into the 1960s and Russett noted that the range of fluctuation in opposition to and support of defense spending was only about 20% during that time (Ref. 16, p. 65).

But, something happened to that permissive attitude between 1960 and 1969. Table VII lists the responses to the Gallup Poll questions on defense spending from 1969 through July 1977, with 1960 included only as an indication of the previous attitude.

Table VII. The Public Attitude Toward Defense Spending

When asked	Too much	About right	Too little
March 1960	18%	45%	21%
July 1969	52	31	8
March 1971	49	31	11
August 1972	42	40	9
February 1973	42	40	8
September 1973	46	30	13
September 1974	44	32	12
January 1976	36	32	22
July 1977	23	40	27

Source: Ref. 14, survey 625-K and Ref. 15, No. 50, 71, 88, 93, 101, 112, 129 and 146.

It should be pointed out that all questions, except for the ones in August 1972 and March 1960, were identical. All the questions do, however, have essentially the same context and are equally unbiased. These data indicate that opposition to defense spending increased from less than 20% in 1960 to 52% in 1969, remained above 40% through 1974 and averages 47% over the 1969-1974 period. It should be noted that these data, while significant by themselves, are somewhat biased due to U.S. military involvement in Southeast Asia. A certain

portion of the respondents in each category probably answered as they did due to their views relative to the Vietnam issue and not the issue of U.S. national security.

Likewise there is no way to adequately measure the relationship between the end of U.S. involvement in Southeast Asia and the decreased opposition to defense spending since 1974. One could logically conclude that if the increased opposition to defense spending in the late 1960s and early 1970s were due to Southeast Asia, that that opposition should decrease and the about right category increase when U.S. involvement therein ended. While the about right category has changed somewhat, the most significant offsetting increase has been in the percentage of respondents favoring increased defense spending. That category averaged approximately 10% over the 1969-1974 period, but increased from 12% to 27% between 1974 and 1977. This increase in turn suggests an increased public concern for the current capabilities of the U.S. Armed Forces to ensure U.S. national security. While these changes since 1974 do not indicate a new long-term trend is in the making, they do indicate that the public is generally more concerned now than it has been since the early 1960s.

The data presented in this section indicate that public concern for national security, as measured by the public attitude toward defense spending, can be broken down into three periods. During the first period, from 1950 through the mid 1960s, the public was generally receptive to high or

increasing defense expenditures. From the late 1960s through about 1974 opposition to defense spending was at a previously unprecedented high level which was at least partially due to U.S. military involvement in Vietnam. During the third period, from 1974 through 1977, the opposition to defense spending has decreased and support for high and increased defense spending has sharply increased. This increased support suggests an increased public concern for the current capabilities of the Armed Forces to ensure U.S. national security.

D. THE SPECIALIZED POLLS

The final aspect of measuring public concern for national security considered in this chapter is that of the specialized polls and questions. The polls are largely an outgrowth of the past decade's move toward standardizing and systematically attacking all aspects of political science research related to public opinion polling. While the available data base developed by this new movement is limited to only certain years during the period since the mid-1960s, since the same questions are used time and again, the results are comparable over time and worthy of note.

In their "hopes and fears" analysis, Cantril and Roll found that the American fear of war had decreased significantly from 64% in 1959, to 50% in 1964, and only 30% in 1971 (Ref. 18, p. 22-23). An associated measure of "worries and concerns" by Watts and Free shows that overall concern for

foreign affairs and defense matters has also decreased since the mid 1960s. Table VIII shows that the five items of greatest public concern in a 1964 survey were all related to foreign affairs or national security, but that those items had slipped considerably in the 1972 and 1976 surveys, being replaced by domestic issues such as crime, drugs, and the environment (Ref. 19, p. 33-41, and Ref. 20, p. 9-11).

Table VIII. Worries and Concerns Rankings

	1964	1972	1976
Keeping the country out of war/danger of war	1	15	20
Combating or the threat of communism	2	14	20
Keeping our military defense strong	3	9	11
Controlling nuclear weapons	4	-	16
Maintaining respect for the U.S. abroad	5	10	16

While these measures substantiate the overall trend in the Gallup Poll most important problem responses, it is also significant to note some of the more direct measures aimed at tracing public concern for national security over time. In addition to the straight ranking measures developed by Watts and Free, they have developed some composite measures which deal with the individual question or issue (Ref. 19, p. 355-357). Table IX shows the trends from 1964 through 1976 for three of the more critical areas of public concern for national security. These data indicate that although

there was a general decrease in concern between 1964 and 1972, that trend has been reversed at least somewhat in all three areas since that time and that the concern for keeping U.S. military and defense forces is now at the same level it was in the mid 1960s (Ref. 19, p. 33-41 and Ref. 20, p. 9-11).

Table IX. Critical Measures of Public Concern (composite scores)

	1964	1968	1972	1974	1976
Keeping our military and defense forces strong	83	81	61	74	81
Danger of war	90	83	66	66	74
Threat of communism	86	79	69	69	74

These specialized polls and questions indicate that even though the primary concerns may now be domestic issues, the American public has not forgotten about national security. While they tend to substantiate the general conclusions which can be drawn from the Gallup Poll data, these specialized polls also indicate that public concern for national security can in fact be measured, however, it requires a systematic and direct attack on the problem.

E. CONCLUDING REMARKS

At this point it seems reasonable to conclude that the newspaper oriented Gallup Poll® does not provide sufficient data to adequately and accurately measure the public concern for national security over time. There is a considerable volume of data available, but most of it is oriented toward specific and largely isolated areas and there are no consistently asked

questions which directly attack the problem over time. It should, however, in all fairness, be noted that the Gallup Organization is in the business of supporting subscriber newspapers requirements and of necessity oriented to the issues of the day and not in-depth trend analysis. It is not the poll's fault if national security is not one of those burning issues.

Even with these limitations, the poll data have provided a number of useful indications of the major changes in public concern for national security over the 1950-1977 period, which are generally substantiated by the results of some of the more direct specialized polls of the past 10-15 years. Figure 16 is a graphic summarization of the various measures discussed in this chapter. It is interesting to note that the Gallup Poll question and most important problem indicators both indicate that the public concern was significantly different before and after the 1963-1964 time frame. From 1950 through that time, the public was not only generally supportive of high or increased defense spending, but also more concerned with the world and domestic issues which could potentially affect U.S. national security. Aside from the Korean War peaks, concern was highest during periods of international tension and the historic launching of sputnik did not significantly change the overall level of concern.

The period after 1964 is, however, in sharp contrast to the previous decade. Not only did public concern for the world and domestic national security related environment and



Figure 16. Public Concern for National Security

issues diminish, but so did the pollsters' interest in national security as an issue of the day. Vietnam actually dominated concern in the late 1960s and domestic problems assumed a higher priority than defense or foreign affairs issues. Only since about 1974 have there been indications of renewed public concern for national security. While the more indirect most important problem measure has shown a general reversal of the previous downward trend since 1974, the more direct specialized poll questions and the increased support for high or increased defense spending indicates that there is a somewhat increased or renewed public concern for national security.

V. TO COUNTER THE THREAT

The objective of this chapter is to provide an explanatory link between the major changes in presidential, Congressional, and public concern for national security over the 1950-1977 period with changes in the perceived threat to the U.S. as well as the actions taken to develop forces to counter it. The national security remarks of the state of the union presentations provide the basis for this chapter since they address the changing nature of the threat and what has been and needs to be done to counter it. A more specific indication is also provided by reviewing the major changes in U.S. forces-in-being and where the DOD spends the defense dollar relative to service emphasis.

A. WHAT THE PRESIDENT SAID

The State of the Union remarks on national security are particularly relevant to this section, since they indicate both the general nature of the threat and also recommended programs and actions to counter it. While there are limits as to what can be said in such a public presentation, Presidents have generally used the state of the union presentation to justify major defense policies and programs and comment on the world military balance and U.S. military capabilities. The actual remarks are too lengthy to be contained herein, but are summarized in Appendix D and commented on in this section.

The 1950 message was given in what was essentially a "peacetime" environment and President Truman indicated that the U.S. would "maintain a strong and well-balanced defense organization." The 1951 and 1952 messages were, however, dramatically different, with emphasis given to both the events in Korea and the growing threat of Soviet military power. President Truman indicated that the Soviet Union had continued to expand its military production and increase its "already excessive military power." After noting that the Soviet Union had detonated two more atomic devices in 1951, he said that the U.S. had not made adequate progress in the field of defense against atomic attack and that that failure was the same as adding to the enemy's supply of atomic weapons. He also indicated that the U.S. had to convert plants and divert materials to defense production in order to develop a "capacity to turn on short notice arms and supplies that may be needed for a full-scale war," and added that 1953-1954 would be the peak period for defense production. In the 1953 message, both Presidents Truman and Eisenhower emphasized the need for defensive strength and preparedness, however, there was greater emphasis on military accomplishments and U.S. retaliatory power, than on what needed to be done to counter the threat.

However, only one year later, President Eisenhower placed added emphasis on what needed to be done. In the 1954 and 1955 messages he indicated that increasing Soviet strategic air power necessitated the strengthening (1954) and later

acceleration of continental defense efforts, including civil defense. Additionally, he pointed to the need to place heavy emphasis on the air power of the Navy and Air Force, increase supplies of nuclear weapons, and share tactical nuclear weapon technology with the European allies to strengthen the overall defense effort. In 1956 the emphasis again began to shift toward explaining military accomplishments and developments rather than emphasizing what needed to be done. In that year, President Eisenhower indicated that the development of long range missiles had been on an accelerated basis for some time and that the U.S. was moving as rapidly as possible toward developing nuclear powered ships and aircraft. He added that the production of more modern aircraft would continue and that the U.S. and Canada were developing warning networks to strengthen continental defense.

In 1957 the emphasis was only on general military strength and President Eisenhower indicated that the U.S. security force was the most powerful in U.S. peacetime history. He went on to say that it was a major deterrent to war and that it could "punish heavily any enemy who undertakes to attack us." While the overall emphasis on U.S. military strength continued into 1958, President Eisenhower indicated that 1958 would be a year in which important decisions about the future development of the Armed Forces had to be made. He said that the most powerful deterrent to war was the retaliatory power of SAC and Navy aircraft and that the U.S. had a broadly based and efficient defensive strength. The problem was not the

strength today, but rather the "vital necessity of action today to ensure our strength tomorrow."

The President acknowledged the consensus opinion that the launch of Sputnik, in the fall of 1957, had demonstrated that the U.S. was behind the Soviets in some areas of long range missile technology development. But, he did indicate that it was his conviction that the U.S. could have the missiles, in the needed quantity and in time, to augment the deterrent power of manned bombers, if the necessary action was taken. The net result was to indicate that there was a need to again accelerate ballistic missile programs and also the defense efforts associated with warning equipment, strategic bomber dispersal, and antimissile missiles. With regard to other forces, the President noted that the Thor and Jupiter intermediate range ballistic missiles (IRBM) were already ordered into production, but he also said that the development of advanced aircraft, nuclear powered ships and submarines, improved ASW weapons, and mobile forces needed to be accelerated.

Only one year later, President Eisenhower began to shift the emphasis from the potential threat and what was required to counter it, to highlighting the military accomplishments of the previous year. In 1959 the President indicated that the IRBMs were being deployed to operational units and that great strides were being made in ballistic missile development and that the Atlas intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) was marked for rapid development. He also noted that

the U.S. had successfully placed five satellites in orbit and that the latest one foreshadowed new developments in worldwide communications.

President Eisenhower continued to emphasize the military accomplishments in his 1960 and 1961 messages. In 1960 he noted that "America possesses an enormous defense power" and added "it is my studied conviction that no nation will ever risk general war against us unless we should be so foolish as to neglect the defense forces we now so powerfully support." He also indicated that U.S. long range striking power, unmatched in manned bombers, had taken on a new strength as the Atlas ICBM became operational in 1959 and that the Polaris ballistic missile submarines which were becoming operational would be one of the most effective sentinels of peace. In that same message the President also acknowledged the continued need to modernize tactical forces in order to be prepared to meet a situation of less than general nuclear war. In his final message in 1961, President Eisenhower briefly reviewed the military developments of the previous eight years with particular emphasis on the "tremendous advances in strategic weapons systems." He also cautioned that the U.S. "must not return to the crash program psychology of the past when each new feint by the Communists was responded to in panic," and noted that the "bomber gap" had been a fiction and that the "missile gap" showed every sign of being the same.

President Kennedy apparently did not agree with his predecessor and eighteen days later indicated that the "tide of events has been running out and time has not been our friend." He went on to add that the lack of a consistent, coherent military strategy had necessitated a complete reappraisal of U.S. national security strategy. However, even while that study was underway, immediate action was required to increase strategic mobility forces and accelerate the already accelerated ballistic missile programs, with particular emphasis on the Polaris ballistic missile submarines. The President went on to add, "we need an invulnerable missile force powerful enough to deter any aggressor from even threatening an attack he would know could not destroy enough of our own force to prevent his own destruction." In 1962, the primary emphasis was on the improved strategic and tactical military posture. President Kennedy also noted that the all-or-nothing posture would leave no choice but inglorious retreat or unlimited retaliation. He went on in 1962 and again in 1963, to indicate that there was a need to improve air, missile, and civil defense programs and to develop a more powerful and flexible non-nuclear force with anti-guerrilla capabilities.

In 1964 President Kennedy indicated that the U.S. must and would maintain the "margin of military safety and superiority" in conventional, strategic, and anti-guerrilla forces that President Kennedy developed and successfully used in the Cuban Missile Crisis and nuclear test ban treaty. After

the 1964 address, President Johnson made very little reference to national security except for noting in 1967 that the Soviet Union had increased ballistic missile capabilities and begun to deploy an anti-ballistic missile system around Moscow. This conspicuous lack of reference to national security issues, other than a passing reference or remarks about arms control and disarmament, continued through President Johnson's tenure and President Nixon's 1970 and 1971 messages.

It was not until 1972 that increased emphasis was placed on national security. In that year President Nixon indicated that increased defense spending was required for research and development and to proceed with new weapons systems to "maintain our security at an adequate level." The President indicated that there was a need to proceed with measures to reduce the vulnerability of strategic forces, replace sea and land based ballistic missiles with improved missiles, and deploy the Safeguard ABM system. He went on to add that tactical forces needed improved weapons and that naval ship building had to be increased in order to "maintain our strength at sea." The defense part of the State of the Union series was not presented in 1973 and in his final message in 1974, President Nixon mentioned that increased expenditures were needed to assure continued readiness and force levels, in the face of rising costs, and to give the U.S. the military strength to maintain its security.

In his first message after assuming office, President Force made only a passing reference to national security and

indicated that although fully adequate conventional and strategic forces cost many billions of dollars, the investment was sound insurance for U.S. safety and a more peaceful world. In 1976 President Ford indicated that U.S. "military power is without equal," but added that real growth in defense purchasing power was needed as well as action to reform and strengthen the intelligence community. In his final presentation in 1977, President Ford placed significantly increased emphasis, relative to the preceding fourteen years, on not only national security, but also on what must be done to counter the threat. At that time, the President noted that while U.S. strategic force levels had leveled off, the Soviet Union had continued a slow, steady buildup of its own forces. The President also indicated that, in order to maintain the strategic balance, the U.S. had to look to the 1980s and beyond and urged that the U.S. update the strategic triad by purchasing the B-1 bomber, the Trident ballistic missile submarine, and a more advanced ICBM. Additionally, he indicated that tactical forces, with particular emphasis on naval ship building, needed to be improved so that the U.S. could deter all types of aggression. In his concluding remarks on national security, and for the first time in over a decade, the President warned that it would "require a sustained effort over a period of years to maintain these capabilities."

These remarks indicate that presidential emphasis on national security and military capabilities has varied considerably over the 1950-1977 period. The remarks have ranged

from passing reference, to highlighting accomplishments, to recommendations that certain actions be taken in order to develop the capabilities required to counter the threat to U.S. national security. Table X is provided at this point as a summarization of the major thrust of the national security remarks from the State of the Union messages from 1950 through 1977.

These data indicate that the Presidents, faced by different and changing threats, over the years, have sought to develop different military capabilities to counter the threat at the time. From 1950 through 1953 the Presidents were faced with the need to improve and expand general and all-around strategic and tactical military capabilities including air and civil defense against a possible nuclear attack. From 1954 through 1956, President Eisenhower, faced with an increasing threat posed by Soviet air power, sought to counter that threat by developing a large strategic retaliatory force and improving air and civil defense in order to minimize the destruction of a nuclear attack on the U.S. and in 1957 he indicated that the U.S. was in good shape. Although ballistic missiles were already under development, the technological surprise of Sputnik in 1957 caused an acceleration of those programs, but by 1959 President Eisenhower again indicated that the U.S. was making sufficient progress in countering the threat.

But, President Kennedy saw the problem and the "missile gap" differently and not only accelerated the ballistic missile

Table X. State of the Union Message Emphasis

1950	maintain defense organization
1951	build stronger military forces, faster; increase aircraft and tank production capacity
1952	build up general military capabilities; improve civil defense
1953	U.S. defenses have doubled over past 2½ years
1954	emphasis on air power; strengthen continental and civil defense
1955	emphasis on air power; accelerate continental and civil defense; produce more nuclear weapons
1956	emphasis on aircraft; nuclear ships and submarines; continental and civil defense
1957	U.S. security force most powerful in U.S. history
1958	decisions about future; accelerate ballistic missiles; improve warning and defensive posture, tactical forces
1959	air striking forces powerful deterrent; ICBMs operational; ICBMs progressing
1960	air striking power unmatched in bombers augmented by Atlas ICBMs; Polaris SSBNs becoming operational; modernize tactical forces
1961	reappraise defense strategy; accelerate ballistic missile programs, especially Polaris; increase airlift capability
1962	improve continental defense and warning; significant improvements already
1963	improve continental and civil defense; build up non-nuclear forces
1964-1971	maintain general military capabilities
1972	replace older ICBMs and SLBMs; deploy Safeguard; improve tactical forces, especially Navy
1973	no defense message
1974	increased expenditures needed to assure readiness
1975	defense is costly but sound insurance
1976	defense budget provides for real growth; need to strengthen intelligence community
1977	need new systems to update strategic triad; improve tactical forces, especially Navy

programs, but also pushed for a general upgrade of conventional non-nuclear forces. After the U.S. show of strength in the Cuban crisis, the Presidents devoted only limited references to national security and military capabilities, other than indicating that U.S. capabilities and strength would be maintained. It was almost a decade later that President Nixon gave renewed emphasis to the need to improve military capabilities, both strategic and tactical, with particular emphasis on the Navy. From 1973 through 1975, defense and many other issues were largely overshadowed by Watergate and economic problems and even in 1976 defense received little mention other than noting the need to correct the budget decreases due to inflation. By 1977, President Ford indicated that the situation was such that new systems were needed to update the strategic triad and improved tactical forces, especially the Navy, also required attention.

B. WHAT WAS DEVELOPED

The Department of Defense is tasked with maintaining the military capabilities to counter the perceived threat to U.S. national security. In order to accomplish that mission, the DOD must continually analyze the threat, develop a strategy and military requirements, and subsequently convert those requirements into a specific force structure. Since this is an evolutionary process, changes in U.S. military capabilities and forces-in-being should be indicative of changes in the nature of the perceived threat. These changes can be identified by review of forces-in-being as an indicator of the

major capabilities developed and service emphasis as an indicator of primary mission emphasis and concern.

1. Forces-In-Being

Major changes in military forces-in-being are indicative of the DOD's continuing efforts to develop the capabilities to counter the threat to U.S. national security. Those changes are normally a function of the strategy developed or adopted by the DOD for each President. That is not to say that each new administration will change the prevailing strategy and there are in fact only four distinctive strategies over the span of six presidents between 1950 and 1977:

(1) 1950-1952: Truman: Korean War and beginning Massive Retaliation;
(2) 1953-1960: Eisenhower: Massive Retaliation;
(3) 1961-1968: Kennedy-Johnson: Assured Destruction, and
(4) 1969-1976: Nixon-Ford: Realistic Deterrence.

While the Truman and Eisenhower strategies, aside from Korea, were essentially the same, due to Korea, the force structure development was different. From 1950 through 1952 President Truman was of necessity forced to give increased emphasis to all aspects of the military problem, tactical and strategic, and Army, Navy, and Air Force and all major force levels were approximately doubled during that period. The number of Army divisions increased from 10 to 20 and the number of air defense battalions from 43 to 114. The number of Air Force strategic, tactical, and air defense wings increased from 48 to 106 and the number of major warships from 237 to 407 (Ref. 21, p. 2-3 and Ref. 22, p. 1-2).

Table XI shows the major force level changes since 1952 under Eisenhower and Kennedy-Johnson strategies, Nixon's 1972 baseline force and the 1976 force levels. The Eisenhower strategy was based on strategic superiority and massive retaliation and the data show that tactical forces received generally less emphasis after the effects of the Korean War began to fade. While the number of warships was cut somewhat, the numbers of Army divisions and Army manpower were cut by almost one half. Although the number of Air Force tactical squadrons showed a net increase over the 1953-1960 period, it should be noted that that number actually peaked at 102 squadrons in 1957 and decreased to 61 by 1960. The primary emphasis was clearly on strategic forces. The strategic manned bomber force increased from less than 400 propeller driven B-29, B-36, and B-50 aircraft in 1950 to a peak of over 1850 jet powered B-47 and B-52 aircraft in 1959 (Ref. 23, p. 54). The other significant aspect of the Eisenhower strategy was the emphasis on developing new systems, including IRBMs, ICBMs, and ballistic missile capable nuclear powered submarines. The Eisenhower strategy also gave increased attention to air defense including the initial developmental work on the ABM.

The force structure development initiated by President Kennedy and subsequently carried through by President Johnson, was significantly different from the Eisenhower strategy. Whereas Eisenhower had initiated the major ICBM and SLBM programs, Kennedy accelerated them and then concentrated on

Table XI. Force Structure Evolution 1953-1976

	Eisenhower Strategy 1953-1960[1]	Kennedy-Johnson Strategy 1961-1968[1]	Nixon Strategy 1972 Baseline[1]	1976 Forces[2]
General Purpose Forces				
Army Divisions	20-14[3]	14-19-2/3	13-1/3	16
Army Manpower (millions)	1.53-.87	.86-1.6	.942	.779
AF Tactical Squadrons	57-61[4]	61-95	71	78
Navy Tactical Squadrons	80-80	75-81	61	60
Marine Division/Wing	3/3-3/3	3/3-4/3	3/3	3/3
Warships	408-371	375-423	354	254
Strategic Forces				
Bomber Squadrons:	(84-104)	(125-40)	(30)	(26)
Heavy	18-36	39-34	26	22
Medium	66-104	86-6	4	4
ICBMs:	(0-6)	(28-1054)	(1054)	(1054)
Atlas	0-6[5]	28-0[7]	---	---
Minuteman	---[5]	0-1000	1000	1000
Titan	---	0-54	54	54
SLBMs:	(0-32)	(80-656)	(656)	(656)
Polaris	0-32	80-656	496[8]	448
Poseidon	---	---[5]	160[8]	208

Table XI. Force Structure Evolution 1953-1976 (Continued)

CONUS Air Defense:				
SAMs	0-4,400	2,122-868	913	---
AF Interceptor Squadrons	78-65[6]	54-27	11	6
ABM	---	Sentinel[5]	Safeguard[5]	---[9]

[1]Summarized from 1972 DOD annual report (Ref. 24, p. 155, 157, 161).

[2]Summarized from 1978 DOD annual report (Ref. 4, p. 131, 177, 207, 218, 220, C-5, C-6).

[3]Includes three training divisions that did not have combat assignments.

[4]102 maximum in 1957.

[5]Development initiated and deployment authorized.

[6]96 maximum in 1957.

[7]126 maximum in 1963.

[8]Force goal.

[9]The 100 missile ABM site near Grand Forks, North Dakota was activated and subsequently shut down in 1975.

refinements to those systems. The shift to a strategy of assured destruction prompted the development of an "invulnerable" missile force and saw a significant increase in the number of ballistic missiles in a relatively short period. By the fall of 1962, at the time of the Cuban Missile Crisis, the U.S. had a notable strategic advantage as shown in Table XII (Ref. 23, p. 46).

Table XII. Strategic Force Levels in the Fall 1962

United States		Soviet Union
639	Heavy jet bombers	100
956	Medium jet bombers	1350
284	ICBMs	35
112	SLBMs	---

Ballistic missile force levels continued to increase until 1967, when they stabilized at 1054 ICBMs and 656 SLBMs. This increase was, however, largely at the expense of the strategic manned bombers, since the last production B-52s and B-58s rolled off the line in 1962. With the phase-out of the older B-47s, by 1968 the strategic bomber force consisted of 570 B-52 and 80 B-58 aircraft (Ref. 25, p. 392-395).

Unlike the Eisenhower era, the overall Kennedy-Johnson strategic buildup was not at the expense of the general purpose forces. Even though the 1968 data in Figure 17 are inflated due to Vietnam, it should be noted that the Army was increased to 16 combat ready divisions as early as 1963 (Ref. 26, p. 318). Naval forces also showed an increase as new construction ships joined the fleet at an annual rate of 45 units between 1962 and 1966 (Ref. 4, p. 179). The notable decrease in dedicated

air defense forces reflected a decreased strategic bomber threat, while the development of the Sentinel ABM acknowledged an increase in the ballistic missile threat.

A new strategy variation did not emerge until President Nixon announced the Nixon doctrine and strategy of realistic deterrence and nuclear sufficiency in 1971. By that time almost all force levels, except ICBMs and SLBMs, were at lower levels than they had been in 1968. Aside from the Poseidon and Minuteman III ballistic missile follow-ons, the only change in strategic force levels was the continued attrition of B-52s and the replacement of the 80 B-58s with 66 FB-111s between 1970 and 1971.

Although tactical air and ground forces have received increased emphasis since 1972, the numbers of air defense and naval forces have continued to decrease. The continuing decline in naval forces is largely due to the retirement of numerous World War II and immediate post-war vintage ships, which were kept active during Vietnam. Additionally, new ship construction averaged only eight units per year between 1967 and 1971, and although that rate has been increased to fifteen units per year between 1972 and 1976 (Ref. 4, p. 179), it has not been enough to offset the mothballing rate. The decrease in air defense forces was due to the phaseout of active air defense SAMs in 1975, the decision to inactivate the ABM system after one month of operation, and the reduction of manned air defense fighter-interceptors to an almost insignificant six squadrons. Aside from the continuing attrition of the

strategic manned bomber force, the numbers of ICBMs and SLBMs has remained unchanged since 1967.

Even though this section is based on "bean counting" and does not take into account overall qualitative improvements, the numerical changes in force levels are not without significance. Regardless of qualitative improvements, there is a difference between 6 air defense fighter squadrons, no SAMs, and no ABMs and 65 air defense fighter squadrons and 4,400 SAMs' or between 400 and 1950 manned strategic bombers; or the 254 major naval combatants today when the U.S. sea power is being challenged and 408 similar units, when the U.S. ruled the seas.

The data indicate that force levels and emphasis have varied over the years and that different presidents and administrations have had different opinions about the utility and necessity of the various forces over the years. Figure 17 is a graphic summarization of the periods during which the various forces and capabilities received increased emphasis. The information provided by this figure indicates that:

(1) the Truman administration emphasized all tactical force capabilities and also strategic bombers and air defense forces;

(2) the Eisenhower administration emphasized strategic forces and air defense from 1953 through 1960 and Air Force tactical air through 1957;

(3) the Kennedy-Johnson administration emphasized all tactical forces, and ballistic missiles instead of strategic manned bombers; and



Figure 17. Forces-In-Being Emphasis

(4) there was a notable lack of emphasis from 1968 to 1972 and since that time only Army and Air Force tactical forces have shown increased numerical emphasis.

2. Changes in Service and Program Emphasis

Another means of identifying the DOD's efforts to counter the threat is to look at where the defense dollar is spent. Since the major missions of the Army and Navy are tactical and that of the Air Force is strategic, the changing proportion of defense allocations to each of the three services can be used as an indicator of mission emphasis. An additional and more direct measure of mission emphasis is the breakdown between strategic and general purpose forces, which has been used in DOD financial summaries since the early 1960s.

Figure 18 shows the relative percentage share of defense expenditures devoted to each of the major services over the 1950-1977 period. The figure indicates that the Army has received its greatest emphasis during periods of U.S. military involvement overseas and comparatively less emphasis at all other times. It also shows that the Air Force percentage share increased significantly between 1950 and 1954, peaked in 1957 at 48.5%, and remained at greater then 46% through 1961. Although the Air Force share subsequently decreased to about 34% in 1970, it was the dominant service from 1954 through 1969. The Navy percentage share decreased significantly between 1950 and 1952, fluctuated between 28% and 32% from 1954 through 1971, and has steadily increased since that time.

Figure 19 shows the relative percentage share of defense expenditures devoted to strategic and general purpose forces over the 1962-1977 period. This figure indicates that the strategic forces have received a generally decreasing share of the defense expenditures from 1962 through the early 1970s and that that percentage has remained below 10% since 1972, compared to greater than 20% in 1962. It also shows that the percentage devoted to general purpose forces increased over the 1964-1967 period, decreased as the U.S. involvement in Southeast Asia was reduced, but has increased since 1976.

The combination of the trends from the two figures indicates that the strategic mission emphasis increased between 1950 and 1957, dominated the DOD expenditures between 1954 and 1964, and was comparatively reduced between 1964 and 1976. The tactical force mission received its greatest emphasis between 1950 and 1952, during Vietnam, and since 1972. It is significant to note that the increased emphasis on the Army in 1950-1952 was apparently at the expense of the Navy and the increased emphasis on the Navy since 1972 has largely been at the expense of the Army.

C. CONCLUSION

The data presented in this chapter, as graphically summarized in Figure 20, indicate that the presidential state of the union remarks on national security are generally indicative of the forces and capabilities which will be developed in the upcoming years. These data indicate that overall emphasis from 1950 to 1953 was on all around military capabilities,



Figure 18. Service Emphasis



Figure 19. Mission Emphasis

tactical and strategic. From 1953 through 1960 the primary emphasis was on strategic manned bombers and air and civil defense capabilities. From 1961 through 1967 the strategic emphasis was shifted from manned bombers to ballistic missiles, but conventional non-nuclear forces also received increased emphasis, even before Vietnam. 1969 to 1976 appears to be a period of some uncertainty as to what was really needed. From 1969 to 1972 there was a general decrease in conventional forces due to the draw down after Vietnam. That decreasing trend was reversed between 1972 and 1976 and there were also some qualitative improvements to the ballistic missile force. Although the president placed added emphasis on correcting the naval force decline, that emphasis has not been noted in the number of major combatants due to the retirement of numerous older ships and the decision to build fewer, larger, more capable, and more expensive replacements. It is significant to note that after this period of uncertainty, President Ford's 1977 remarks were similar to President Eisenhower's 1958 remarks in that he seemed to indicate that 1977 was a year of decision relative to the future of U.S. military development, when he said that there was a need to continue the upgrading of conventional capabilities, and also procure follow-on systems to the aging strategic triad.



Figure 20. To Counter the Threat

VI. THE CHANGING NATURE OF CONCERN

The individual measures discussed thus far indicate that presidential, Congressional, and public concern for national security is not static and that it has varied from time to time over the period from 1950 to 1977. While there is no single or overall trend, the measures all indicate that concern was relatively high from 1950 through the early 1960s, considerably lower from the mid 1960s through the early 1970s, and somewhat greater since about 1974. Figure 21 provides a graphic summarization of the various measures of concern which were discussed in Chapters II through IV and the U.S. force structure evolution which was addressed in Chapter V. Although the data presented by the various measures do not provide sufficient detail to explain the causal relationships between measures, they do, when coupled with what the President said and what the Department of Defense developed to counter the threat, provide an insight into the why and wherefore of the major changes and relative highpoints of concern between 1950 and 1977.

A. A PERIOD OF CONCERN: 1950-1962

It should be recalled that the overrunning of Eastern Europe, the coup in Czechoslovakia, and the Berlin blockade had set the stage for the Cold War and produced the level of concern which existed in 1950. But, it was the breaking of the U.S. nuclear monopoly and the Korean War which reinforced



Figure 21. Changing Concern for U.S. National Security

the reality of the "communist threat" and prompted a previously unprecedented level of peactime support for the military and defense spending. During the height of the Korean War, the need to "contain" communism was reflected by increases in presidential and Congressional concern, as measured herein, as well as a generally high level of public support for increased defense expenditures and also public concern for the potential "threat of war" and "communism."

It was during the 1951-1953 period that the increasing Soviet military power and the corresponding increased threat to the United States was openly acknowledged in the State of the Union Messages. In addition to building up conventional forces for the Korean conflict, the U.S. had to develop a force structure that could counter the threat of Soviet air power, which was nullifying the historical U.S. geographic advantage by developing a capability to bring the destruction of nuclear warfare to the U.S. homeland. The countering strategy which evolved, that of massive retaliation, necessitated the build up of a strategic retaliatory force which could absorb a first strike and retain a sufficient capability to strike back and cripple the warmaking potential of the enemy as well as civil and military defenses to minimize the effects of a first strike.[8] As the Korean War drew to a stalemate in 1953, the total military problem was apparently coming under control and there was a notable decrease in expressed presidential concern and defense requests and appropriations.

But, President Eisenhower expressed increased concern for the growing potential of Soviet air power in 1954 and 1955 and although defense requests and appropriations decreased after the end of hostilities in Korea, they did not return to the pre-war level. Aside from the Korean War peak, the overall net increase of approximately 100% in requests and appropriations between 1951 and 1955, indicates that "official" (presidential, Congressional, and DOD) concern for U.S. security was significantly higher after the Korean War than it had been before. Expressed presidential and public concern decreased after 1955; however, requests and appropriations continued a slow, steady increase in order to procure the strategic manned bombers and air defense forces required to counter the threat. By mid 1955 the strategic retaliatory force of over 1200 aircraft was about three times the 1950 force level and air defense forces, which had also been significantly increased, were being augmented by antiaircraft missiles. Defense budget requests continued a slow upward tendency through FY 1958; however, Congressional concern apparently followed the lead of expressed presidential and public concern. As an expression of its decreased concern, the Congress decided that less money was needed for defense and the FY 1958 appropriations, as voted into law in mid 1957, were noticeably lower than either the request or the previous year's appropriations. The decreased public, Congressional, and expressed presidential concern suggests that there was a general consensus that the U.S. was making

sufficient progress toward countering the "bomber gap" and the threat to U.S. national security.

However, less than a year later, that sense of security was shaken by the launch of sputnik, which demonstrated that the Soviet Union was making substantial progress in ballistic missile technology. Although President Eisenhower devoted a considerable portion of his 1958 state of the union presentation to national security and action(s) required to counter this emerging new threat, hindsight indicates that his remarks were largely oriented toward reinforcing public and Congressional support for continued heavy investment in the defense effort. This call for renewed support was probably necessitated by the decreased Congressional concern and decreasing public concern. Even though the Cold War philosophy had dominated America since the late 1940s, there had been a notable lack of war or conflict which directly threatened the U.S. homeland and the 1950s had proved to be a period of unprecedented domestic prosperity. Sputnik therefore provided the psychological impact required to revitalize support for continued military development.

Although the defense budget request following sputnik (FY 1959) increased somewhat, Congressional defense appropriations increased more sharply indicating the Congress either thought that the threat was more serious or was attempting to restore what had been cut from the preceding year's request. In either case, both requests and appropriations leveled off in FY 1960 and 1961 and in a related move, Eisenhower shifted

his state of the union presentation emphasis from what needed to be done to what had been accomplished. This shift of emphasis and leveling off of requests and appropriations indicates that, even as early as 1959, the Eisenhower administration felt that sufficient progress was again being made toward developing the capabilities and forces to counter the new threat. As President Eisenhower prepared to leave office in late 1960, the U.S. strategic retaliatory arsenal included over 1500 modern jet bombers, six ICBMs in place, and two operational Polaris ballistic missile submarines. These data indicate that sputnik did not have a significant long-range impact on the Eisenhower administration's concern for U.S. national security.

The impact of sputnik and Eisenhower's call for support is not readily identifiable in the measures of public concern investigated herein. "Sputnik" and "space" were cited by a small percentage of the respondents to the most important problem question in 1958; however, there was no notable change in overall public concern during that year. Although there is no real way to measure or identify the impact of sputnik, since public concern stopped decreasing in 1958 and began increasing in 1959, it appears that sputnik provided the impetus for reversing the downward trend in public concern. It may well have provided the backdrop for increased public concern about the international situation and international tension in Africa, Berlin, Southeast Asia, and Cuba between 1959 and 1962.

While the Eisenhower administration had reacted to sputnik, but not the "missile gap," the Kennedy administration, as did the public, reacted to the "missile gap." Only eighteen days after President Eisenhower's farewell state of the union presentation, the newly inaugurated president indicated that he did not agree with his predecessor and that the entire defense strategy was under review. Even while that review was underway, the new administration ordered the acceleration of the strategic ballistic missile programs, with particular emphasis on SLBMs, and improvements in strategic mobility forces for quick response to non-nuclear conflicts. President Kennedy's increased concern in 1961 was reflected in the sharply increased defense requests and appropriations in FY 1962 and a continued high level in FY 1963.

By the fall of 1962 a substantial ballistic missile force had been added to the already unmatched strategic bomber force and the outcome of the Cuban Missile Crisis attested to the overall U.S. military capability. While that event had served to highlight U.S. military superiority vis-a-vis the Soviet Union, the Soviet foreign policy failures in the Middle East and Africa indicated that communism was effectively being "contained." The combination of these events in turn indicated that Premier Khrushchev's boastful, saber-rattling speeches of the previous years had been just that, and that the threat to the U.S. national security, as well as world peace and security, was not as great as had been previously estimated. There was, therefore, less reason to be concerned with national security

and more attention could be diverted from the military effort and devoted to the increasing number of domestic problems and issues. In addition to decreased public concern, defense requests and appropriations, which had leveled off in FY 1963, decreased significantly after the Cuban Missile Crisis (FY 1964-1967), as did expressed presidential concern for actions required after January 1963.

B. THE GLORY OF 1962

President Johnson not only highlighted U.S. military capabilities in his 1964 state of the union presentation, but also set the stage for almost a decade of significantly decreased concern for U.S. national security when he said that the U.S. would maintain the "margin of military safety and superiority" that President Kennedy had developed and successfully used in the Cuban crisis and nuclear test ban treaty. Aside from the immediate decrease in presidential, Congressional, and public concern after the 1962-1963 breakpoint, the post-Cuban Missile Crisis period is difficult to explain and the individual measures of concern investigated in this thesis are adversely affected by events such as the war in Vietnam, the 6-Day War, Watergate, the recession of the early-mid 1970s and President Nixon's resignation. The individual measures are not as readily comparable as they were between 1950 and 1962-1963; however, each measure provides some insight into concern for U.S. national security since the Cuban Missile Crisis.

Perhaps the most striking indicator of the overall decreased concern for U.S. national security following the 1962-1963 breakpoint, is the conspicuous lack of expressed presidential concern for action(s) required and also the decreased emphasis on national security in the state of the union presentations between 1964 and 1971. It should also be noted that aside from the general remarks which linked peace in Southeast Asia to world peace and security and U.S. security, the Vietnam issue was addressed as a separate issue in the State of the Union Messages and not associated with a real threat to U.S. national security, as was Korea fifteen years earlier.

Although the impact of Southeast Asia was not considered relevant to this analysis, other than attempting to correct the measures for it, it is difficult to ignore, since it dominated the most important problem from 1966 through 1969. It appears that the public initially felt that the situation in Southeast Asia was similar to the situation in Korea fifteen years earlier and there was an implied relationship between "Vietnam," "the threat of war," and the "spread of world communism" between May 1965 and May 1966. However, the fact that similar responses were not reported after that time, even though "Vietnam" remained the predominant problem through 1969, indicates that the public, like the president, generally disassociated the situation in Southeast Asia from any threat to U.S. national security. When other national security related responses to the most important problem question reappeared in

1970, that measure indicated that public concern was even lower than it had been prior to Vietnam. Except for a slight increase in 1973, which was probably related to the situation in the Middle East, public concern continued a general decreasing tendency until it hit an all-time low in 1974-1975.

The defense budget request and Congressional defense appropriations measures of concern are somewhat of an anomaly since they oscillate up and down between 1968 and the mid 1970s. While these oscillations are not readily explainable, they are probably related to U.S. military involvement in Southeast Asia and also some uncertainty as to what the U.S. needed to do to stay on top of the military balance problem. Although the impact of Southeast Asia was corrected for by subtracting the estimated incremental costs of U.S. involvement there from the requests and appropriations measures, it should be recognized that it is impossible to account for the total financial impact, since no adequate records were kept. It is likely that the increases in FY 1968 and 1969 were required to replace equipment and supplies which had been diverted from the "national security forces" in CONUS or Europe to Southeast Asia or even to Israel following the 1967 war. While the oscillations since FY 1970 may likewise be related to Southeast Asia or the Middle East, they are probably also related to the uncertainty surrounding both the implications and seriousness of the most recent Soviet military developments and also the effectiveness of U.S. forces-in-being and under development to counter it.

The only measure which showed a notable increase clearly indicative of increased concern for U.S. national security through the early 1970s was expressed presidential concern. After a conspicuous eight year lack of expressed presidential concern, President Nixon gave considerable emphasis to both action(s) required and underway in 1972. At that time, he indicated that the ballistic missile force, which had reached it numerical peak in 1967, was being qualitatively improved and updated and that conventional forces, especially the Navy, required increased attention to upgrade their capabilities. While this seemed to signal a new period of increased "official" concern for U.S. national security, pressing high level national problems including Watergate, the recession, President Nixon's possible impeachment and his eventual resignation, caused attention to be turned away from national security. The fluctuations in expressed presidential concern and defense requests and appropriations between 1972 and 1976 do, however, suggest that concern increased in 1972 and that although the military problem seemed manageable, there was some uncertainty. Aside from the references to the need to spend money on defense or correct future expenditures for the adverse effects of inflation, it was not until 1977 that the president again expressed considerable concern for what needed to be done to ensure the capabilities to counter the threat to U.S. national security.

C. A NEW TREND?

While the early 1970s are at best indicative of increased but uncertain concern, all of the measures addressed herein indicate an increased level of concern since at least 1976. The single most significant indicator of increased concern is probably expressed presidential concern, but public support for defense spending has also significantly increased. While President Ford had indicated that the adverse impact of inflation on defense spending had been corrected by the FY 1975 and 1976 budgets, in 1977 he went on to note that specific action(s) were required in order to maintain the capability to counter the threat to U.S. national security. Specifically, he noted that:

(1) U.S. strategic force levels had leveled off, while the Soviet Union continued a slow, steady buildup of strategic forces;

(2) in order to maintain the strategic balance, the U.S. must look to the 1980s and beyond and update the strategic triad with new weapons systems; and that

(3) tactical forces, especially the Navy required increased attention.

In pointing to the need to look to the 1980s and beyond, President Ford's concluding remarks, which warned that "it will require a sustained effort over a period of years" to maintain U.S. military capabilities, were reminiscent of President Eisenhower's call for renewed support for military development after sputnik. Indeed the situations are similar.

The other measures investigated herein also point to a general increase in concern during the past couple of years. Defense budget requests and Congressional defense appropriations, no longer complicated by the cost of Southeast Asia, have shown a steady constant dollar increase since FY 1974. The increase in public concern in 1976 appears to have at least reversed the downward trend which started after 1962 and hit a record low, as measured by the most important problem, in 1974. But, the most important indicator of public concern may be the attitude toward defense spending. Although there was a notable decrease in opposition to defense spending following the end of U.S. involvement in Southeast Asia, the most significant change is the increased support for defense spending since 1974. That support has increased from 10% over the 1969-1974 period to 27% in May 1977, a level which is higher than it was during the "missile gap" in 1960.

This is admittedly not sufficient evidence to declare that the U.S. is returning to the Cold War era of concern; however, it does indicate that concern for national security in the mid 1070s is greater than it was during the previous decade. This increased concern may also indicate that the United States has regained its sense of purpose since the post-Vietnam retreat from the world arena and recognized that the general trends in the military balance since the late 1960s have not necessarily favored the U.S. If this increased concern continues, it may well indicate that after fifteen years, the U.S. is no longer basking in the glory of October 1962 and

facing up to the fact that as former Secretary of Defense James R. Schlesinger pointed out, that only the U.S. can counter-balance the Soviet Union and "there will be no deus ex machina; there is no one else waiting in the wings" (Ref. 27, p. 14).

APPENDIX A

CONGRESSIONAL CONCERN DATA

The Cost of Defense ($ millions)

Fiscal Year	Defense Appropriations[1]	"National Defense"[2]	"National Security"[3]
1950	12,950	12,405	29,880
1951	13,294	21,775	24,835
1952	56,940	43,261	53,993
1953	46.611	49,864	59,452
1954	34,372	46,403	54,802
1955	28,800	39,862	49,267
1956	31,883	39,754	50,633
1957	34,657	42,266	54,155
1958	33,760	43,821	55,972
1959	39,603	45,936	58,856
1960	39,228	45,219	59,008
1961	39,997	46,596	61,461
1962	46,663	50,376	66,878
1963	48,136	51,548	69,622
1964	47,220	52,738	73,457
1965	46,752	48,581	71,092
1966	46,887	55,856	81,256
1967	58,068	69,101	95,855
1968	69,937	79,409	105,573
1969	71,870	80,207	107,018
1970	69,641	79,284	108,287
1971	66,956	76,807	107,228
1972	70,519	77,356	109,949
1973	74,373	75,072	110,076
1974	73,715	78,569	120,631
1975	82,096	86,585	133,158
1976	90,467	92,759	145,216

[1](Ref. 8)
[2](Ref. 4, p. C-10)
[3]Calculated value

Correction Factors and Corrected Appropriations ($ millions)

Fiscal Year	Defense Appropriations[1]	Incremental Southeast Asia Costs[2]	Federal Purchases Deflator[3]	Deflated Appropriations with Southeast Asia	Deflated Appropriations without Southeast Asia
1950	12,950		39.9	32,455	
1951	13,294		47.1	28.226	
1952	56,940		48.9	116,440	
1953	46,611		50.2	92,850	
1954	34,372		50.4	68,197	
1955	28,800		51.1	56,360	
1956	31,883		53.4	59,706	
1957	34,657		55.7	62,220	
1958	33,760		58.1	58,107	
1959	39,603		58.7	67,466	
1960	39,228		59.1	66,376	
1961	39,997		60.0	66,661	
1962	46,663		61.8	75,505	
1963	48,136		63.3	76,045	
1964	47,220		64.8	72,870	
1965	46,752	100	67.0	69,779	69,630
1966	46,887	5,800	70.1	66,886	58,612
1967	58,068	18,400	72.6	79,983	54,639
1968	69,937	20,000	76.4	91,540	65,363
1969	71,870	21,500	80.0	89,837	62,963
1970	69,641	17,400	86.4	80,603	60,464
1971	66,956	11,500	92.6	71,918	59,498
1972	70,519	7,200	100.0	70,519	63,319
1973	74,373	5,300	105.8	70,296	65,286
1974	73,715	2,700	117.1	62,950	60,645
1975	82,096	1,100	130.0	63,151	62,305
1976	90,467	300	138.0	65,556	65,338

[1] (Ref. 8)

[2] (Ref. 6, p. 326)

[3] (Ref. 9, p. 191)

APPENDIX B

STATE OF THE UNION MESSAGES

President	Date of Message
Harry S. Truman	January 4, 1950
	January 8, 1951
	January 9, 1952
	January 7, 1953
Dwight D. Eisenhower	February 2, 1953
	January 7, 1954
	January 6, 1955
	January 5, 1956
	January 10, 1957
	January 9, 1958
	January 9, 1959
	January 7, 1960
	January 12, 1961
John F. Kennedy	January 31, 1961
	January 30, 1962
	January 14, 1963
Lyndon B. Johnson	January 8, 1964
	January 4, 1965
	January 12, 1966
	January 10, 1967
	January 17, 1968
	January 14, 1969
Richard M. Nixon	January 22, 1970
	January 22, 1971
	January 21, 1972
	February 3, 1973[1]
	January 30, 1974
Gerald R. Ford	January 15, 1975
	January 20, 1976
	January 12, 1977

[1]Overview for proposed series of State of the Union Messages.

Correction Factors and Corrected Defense Budget Requests ($ millions)

Fiscal Year	Defense Budget Requests	Incremental Southeast Asia Costs[2]	Federal Purchases Deflator[3]	Deflated Budget Requests with Southeast Asia	Deflated Budget Requests without Southeast Asia
1950	13,249		39.9	33,206	
1051	13,079		47.1	27,769	
1952	57,680		48.9	117,955	
1953	57,391		50.2	102,373	
1954	40,720		50.4	80,794	
1955	29,887		51.1	58,487	
1956	32,233		53.4	60,361	
1957	34,148		55.7	61,307	
1958	36,128		58.1	62,182	
1959	38,197		58.7	65,072	
1960	39,248		59.1	66,409	
1961	39,335		60.0	65,558	
1962	42,942		61.8	69,485	
1963	47,907		63.3	75,682	
1964	49,014		64.8	75,639	
1965	47,471	100	67.0	70,852	70,703
1966	45,249	5,800	70.1	64,549	56,275
1967	57,664	18,400	72.6	79,426	54,058
1968	71,584	20,000	76.4	93,696	66,864
1969	77,074	21,500	80.0	96,343	69,468
1970	75,278	17,400	86.4	87,127	66,988
1971	68,746	11,500	92.6	74,240	61,821
1972	73,544	7,200	100.0	73,544	66,344
1973	79,594	5,300	105.8	75,160	70,221
1974	77,251	2,700	117.1	65,970	63,664
1975	87,058	1,100	130.0	66,968	66,122
1976	97,858	300	138.0	70,912	70,694

[1](Ref. 8)

[2](Ref. 6, p. 326)

[3](Ref. 9, p. 191)

APPENDIX C

THE MOST IMPORTANT PROBLEM DATA

Questions and Responses

The following list of most important problem questions is keyed to the list of responses for the individual surveys contained herein.

QUESTIONS

A. What do you think is the most important problem facing the (this) country today? (48)

B. What do you think is the most important problem facing this country? (2)

C. What do you think is the most important problem facing the nation today? (2)

D. What do you consider the most important problem facing the nation today? (1)

E. In your opinion what is the most important problem facing the country today? (2)

F. What do you regard as the biggest problem, or issue, facing the Government in Washington today? (3)

G. What do you think is the most important problem facing the entire country today? (1)

H. If you could sit down and talk with President Eisenhower about any problem facing this country, what problem would you most like to talk about? (1)

RESPONSES

Survey #454-K March 1950 Question A

War, threat of war	40%
Communism	8%
Atomic bomb control	6%

Survey #480-K September 1951 Question G

War and foreign policy, Russia, threats to peace, cold war	56%
Military preparedness	2%

Survey #510-K January 1953 Question H

The Korean War	54%
Peace, avoiding World War II	7%
The draft	1%

Survey #528-K March 1954 Question A

Threat of war, war in Asia, dealing with Russia	18%
Communism in U.S.	17%
Working out world peace	9%
Foreign policy problems	6%
H-bomb, national defense	6%

Survey #530-K May 1954 Question F

Maintaining world peace, U.S.-Soviet relations	24%
Indochina	18%
Communists in U.S.	16%
Foreign policy	7%
Atomic weapons	2%
Korean settlement	1%

Survey #548-K June 1955 Question F

Foreign policy problems, working out peace, dealing with Russia, Red China	48%
Communism in U.S.	6%

Survey #555-K October 1955 Question F

Keeping the peace, foreign policy, dealing with Russia	42%
Communism in U.S.	5%
Defense preparedness	2%

Survey #570-K September 1956 Question A

Threat of war, Suez, foreign policy	46%
Communism in U.S.	3%
National defense	2%

Survey #572-K October 1956 Question A

War, threat of war, Suez, foreign policy	48%

Survey #583-K May 1957 Question A

Foreign policy, dealing with Russia	40%

Survey #588-K August 1957 Question A

Keeping out of war, relations with Russia	34%
Nuclear tests, atomic control	6%
Foreign aid	3%

Survey #590-K October 1957 Question A

Keeping the peace, foreign policy, dealing with Russia	26%
Defense preparedness	7%
"Sputnik," missiles	6%

Survey #593-K January 1958 Question A

Keeping the peace	30%
Sputnik, space problems	11%
National defense	9%

Survey #596-K March 1958 Question A

Keeping the peace	17%
Sputnik, space problems	7%
National defense	3%

Survey #604-K September 1958 Question A

East-West fight, keeping peace	42%
Nuclear tests	2%

Survey #610-K February 1959 Question A

Keeping the peace	38%
National defense	2%
"Space" problems	2%

Survey #612-K April 1959 Question E

Keeping the peace	44%

Survey #618-K September 1959 Question E

Keeping the peace	51%

Survey #624-K February 1960 Question A

Issues dealing with foreign policy	Overwhelming majority
Missile gap or another area of national defense	15%

Survey #629-K June 1960 Question E

Relations with Russia and the rest of the world	Overwhelming majority

Survey #657-K April 1962 Question A

War, peace, international tension	63%

Survey #669-K March 1963 Question A

Cuba, Castro	24%
Other international problems, Berlin, Laos, etc.	39%

Survey #667-K September 1963 Question A

International problems (Russia-threat of war)	25%

Survey #689 April 1964 Question A

International problems (Russia-threat of war)	41%

Survey #694-K June 1964 Question A

International problems	35%

Survey #696-K August 1964 Question A

International problems	51%

Survey #698-K September 1964 Question A

International problems, cold war problems	46%

Survey #708-K March 1965 Question A

Foreign affairs	39%

Survey #711-K May 1965 Question A

Vietnam	23%
Threat of war	16%
Spread of world communism	9%
Internal communism	3%

Survey #714-K July 1965 Question A

Vietnam	no percentage
Fear of war and atomic bomb	no percentage
Spread of communism	no percentage

Survey #717-KC September 1965 Question A

Vietnam	19%
Threat of general war	17%
World communism	6%
Red China	2%
Russia	1%
Foreign aid	1%

Survey #719-K October-November 1965 Question A

Vietnam	37%
Threat of war	12%
World communism	7%
Threat of Red China	1%

Survey #720-K November 1965 Question A

Vietnam	33%
Threat of World War III	11%
Threat of world communism	9%

Survey #728-K May 1966 Question A

Vietnam crisis	45%
Threat of war	8%
Spread of world communism	5%

Survey #733-K August 1966 Question D

Vietnam war	56%

Survey #735-K October 1966

The war in Vietnam	no percentage

Survey #753-K October-November 1967 Question C

Vietnam	50%

Survey #756 January 1968 Question A

The Vietnam war	53%

Survey #761-K May 1968 Question A

Vietnam situation	42%

Survey #764-K-3 June 1968 Question A

Vietnam war	52%

Survey #766 August 1968 Question A

Vietnam	51%

Survey #773-K January 1969 Question A

Vietnam war	40%

Survey #807-K May 1970 Question A

Vietnam war (including Cambodia)	22%
Other international problems	14%

Survey #814-B September 1970 Question A

Vietnam war	no percentage

Survey #824-K February 1971 Question A

Vietnam, Indochina	28%
Other international problems	12%

Survey #831-K June 1971 Question A

Vietnam	33%
International problems other than Vietnam	7%

Gallup Organization Index (GOI) #76 October 1971 Question A

Vietnam	25%
Other international problems	5%

Survey #840-K November 1971 Question A

Vietnam	15%
Other international problems	8%

Gallup Organization Index (GOI) #86 April 1972 Question A

Vietnam	29%
International problems (general)	12%

GOI #86 June 1972 Question A

Vietnam	32%
International problems (general)	8%

GOI #86 July 1972 Question A

Vietnam	25%
International problems (general)	5%

GOI #88 September 1972 Question A

Vietnam	27%
International probems (general)	10%

GOI #100 February 1973 Question A

Other international problems	11%
Southeast Asia situation	7%

GOI #100 May 1973 Question A

Other international problems	8%
Southeast Asia situation	7%
World peace	6%

GOI #100 September 1973 Question A

International problems	11%

GOI #109 July 1974 Question A

Foreign affairs	4%

GOI #118 February-March 1975 Question A

International problems	5%

GOI #125 October 1975 Question A

Foreign affairs/aid	4%

GOI #131 April 1976 Question A

Foreign affairs 5%

GOI #131 April 1976 Question A

Foreign affairs 5%

GOI #137 October 1976 Question A

Foreign affairs 6%

APPENDIX D

SELECTED STATE OF THE UNION REMARKS

President Truman 1950-1953

1950

We will maintain a strong and well balanced defense organization.

1951

The Soviet Union has a large air force and a strong submarine force.
We are building much stronger military forces and we are building them fast.
...expanding the aircraft industry to produce 50,000 modern military planes a year.
...preparing a capacity to produce 35,000 tanks a year.
...must give priority to urgent activities--military procurement, atomic energy and power development.
...best and most modern equipment for our fighting forces.

1952

...crucial year in defense effort.
...threat of world war is still very real.
The Soviet Union in 1951 continued to expand its military production and increase its already excessive military power.
...Soviet Union still producing more war planes than the free world.
...Soviet Union set off two more atomic explosions.
We have made rapid progress in the field of atomic weapons.
In 1951 we did not make adequate progress in building civil defense against atomic attack.
...failure to provide adequate civilian defense has the same effect as adding to the enemy's supply of atomic bombs.
Our objective is to have a well equipped, active defense force large enough, in concert with our allies, to deter aggression and inflict punishing losses on the enemy if we should be attacked.
...recommend some increases in active forces with particular emphasis on air power.
...next 2 years should be peak period for defense production.

1953

The heart of the free world's defense is the military strength of the U.S.
...1949 Soviet explosion of atomic bomb stimulated planning for defense mobilization.
We have endeavored to keep our lead in atomic weapons.
...had to strengthen our armed forces and enlarge our productive capacity.
...not just a central force that could strike back, but also defenses and strength to hold the line against attack.
...last 2½ years more than doubled our own defenses.

President Eisenhower 1953-1961

1953

While retaliatory power is one strong deterrent, another powerful deterrent is defensive power.
Total defensive strength must include civil defense preparedness.

1954

...strategic changes in the world during the past year.
Our military power continues to grow.
...defense will be stronger if we share our knowledge of tactical use of nuclear weapons with our allies.
...Armed Forces must regain mobility.
...air power of Navy and Air Force receiving heavy emphasis.
Continental defense must be strengthened.
...indispensable part of continental security is civil defense.

1955

...Soviet Union increasing strength in nuclear weapons.
U.S. forces are designed for deterrent and defensive purposes.
...keep Armed Forces balance and flexibility--cannot place undue reliance on one weapon or kind of warfare.
...emphasize modern air power for Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps.
...accelerate continental defense program.
...civil defense is also a key element in the protection of the country.
...continue to expand supplies of nuclear weapons.

1956

...continue to push production of modern aircraft.
Development of long range missiles has been on an accelerated basis for some time.
...moving as rapidly as possible toward nuclear powered aircraft and ships.
...cooperating with Canada to develop warning networks to strengthen continental defense.
...key to civil defense is expanded continental defense program.

1957

Our security force is the most powerful in our history.
It can punish heavily any enemy who undertakes to attack the U.S. ...it is a major deterrent to war.

1958

We now have a broadly based and efficient defensive strength.
...great deterrent power is our main guarantee against war.
Unless we act wisely and promptly we could lose that capacity to deter an attack and defend ourselves.
...most powerful deterrent to war lies in retaliatory power of SAC and Navy aircraft.
...real problem is not our strength today, it is the vital necessity of action today to ensure our strength tomorrow.
...consensus we are probably behind the Soviet Union in some areas of long range ballistic missiles.
...my conviction that if we make the necessary effort, we will have the missiles...to sustain and strengthen our deterrent power of bombers.
...Thor and Jupiter intermediate ballistic missiles ordered into production.
...concentrate all antimissile and satellite technology into one organization.
...accelerate our defense efforts associated with warning equipment, dispersal bases and crews, long range and other effective missiles advanced aircraft development, nuclear submarines and cruisers, improved ASW weapons, missile ships, and mobile forces.

1959

The threat we face is not sporadic or dated--it is continuous.
...our formidable air striking forces are a powerful deterrent.
...great strides made in ballistic missile development.
...intermediate range missiles now being deployed to operational units.
...Atlas ICBM program marked for rapid development.
...successfully placed five satellites in orbit.

...latest satellite foreshadows new developments in worldwide communications. After we have provided wisely for our military strength, we must judge how to allocate our remaining government resources most effectively.

1960

We possess an enormous defensive power.
Long range striking power, unmatched in manned bombers, has taken on a new strength as the Atlas ICBM becomes operational.
Growing numbers of nuclear powered submarines...some to be armed with Polaris missiles, will be one of the most effective sentinels of peace.
...continued modernization of tactical forces is costly, but necessary to add to our strength.
...developing satellites for weather, navigation, communications, early warning, and reconnaissance.

1961

...tremendous advances in strategic weapons over the past 8 years.
...civil and non-military defense has been greatly strengthened.
...since 1953 defense policy based on assumption that the international situation would require heavy defense expenditures for an indefinite period.
...must not return to the crash program psychology of the past when each new feint by the Communists was responded to in panic.
..."bomber gap" was always a fiction--"missile gap" shows every sign of being the same.

President Kennedy 1961-1963

1961

...reappraise entire defense strategy.
...prompt action to increase airlift capability to better ensure the ability of our continental forces to respond to any problem at any spot on the globe.
...step up Polaris submarine program--build and place on station at least nine months earlier than planned.
...accelerate entire missile program.
We need an invulnerable missile force powerful enough to deter any aggressor from even threatening an attack.

1962

...military posture steadily improved.
...more than doubled the acquisition rate of Polaris submarines.
...doubled production capacity for Minuteman.
...increased number of manned bombers on 15-minute alert by 50%.
...doubled the number of combat ready divisions in the Army strategic reserve.
...activated 155,000 Reserve and Guard troops.
...increased troops in Europe.
...built up Marines.
...added new sealift and airlift capabilities.
...expanded the antiguerrilla force.
...increased the active fleet by more than 70 vessels.
...increased the tactical air force by nearly a dozen wings.
Rejected any all or nothing posture which would leave no choice but inglorious retreat or unlimited retaliation.
...nation's first serious civil defense shelter plan is underway.
...coming year will increase air force fighter units and continental defense and warning efforts.

1963

We have undertaken the most far reaching defense improvements in the history of the U.S.
...recognize that nuclear defense is not enough...cannot afford to be in a position of having to answer every threat with nuclear weapons or nothing.
...must improve air and missile defenses and civil defense.
...of prime importance--to have more powerful and flexible non-nuclear forces and antiguerrilla capabilities.
...threats of massive retaliation may not deter piecemeal aggression.

President Johnson 1964-1969 ✶

1964

...maintain the margin of military safety and superiority obtained through three years of steadily increased qualitative and quantitative development of strategic, conventional, and antiguerrilla forces.
...in 1964 we are better prepared than ever before.
...continue to use that strength as John Kennedy used it in Cuban Missile Crisis and for the test ban treaty.

1965-1966

U.S. national security not mentioned aside from association between Vietnam and the communist threat.

1967

...Soviet Union in the past year has increased its long range missile capabilities.
...Soviet Union has begun to deploy a limited ABM system near Moscow.

1968

...must maintain a military force that is capable of deterring any threat to this nation's security.

1969

No substantial reference other than arms limitations.

President Nixon 1970-1974

1970

No substantial reference other than Nixon Doctrine.

1971

No substantial reference.

1972

...ended production of chemical and biological weapons.
...need to proceed with new weapons systems to maintain security at an adequate level.
...need to improve and protect, diversify and disperse strategic forces for reduced vulnerability.
...refit Polaris with Poseidon and build a new missile launching submarine with a new, more effective missile.
...replace older ICBMs with Minuteman III and deploy the Safeguard ABM system.
...strengthen the Navy with emphasis on ship building.
...improve, develop, and procure improved weapons for land and tactical air forces.
...step up military research and development.
We will be as strong as we need to be for as long as we need to be.

1973

Defense message of the proposed State of the Union series was never presented.

1974

...increased defense expenditures needed to assure continued readiness of our military forces and preserve present force levels.

President Ford 1975-1977

1975

Fully adequate conventional and strategic forces cost many, many billions, but these dollars are sound insurance for our safety and a more peaceful world.

1976

Our military forces are capable and ready...our military power is without equal.
Only from a position of strength can we negotiate a balanced agreement to limit the growth of nuclear arms.
...defense budget provides for real growth in purchasing power.

1977

...we have been able to reverse the dangerous decline of the previous decade in the real resources this country was devoting to national defense.
...established a positive trend which is essential to our ability to contribute to peace and stability.
...in past years...our strategic forces leveled off, while the Soviet Union continued a steady, constant buildup.
To maintain a strategic balance we must look ahead to the 1980s and beyond.
...advocate and strongly urge that we purchase Trident, B-1, and a more advanced ICBM.
...we cannot rely solely on strategic forces to guarantee our security or deter all types of aggression.
...five year naval building program is indispensable to maritime strategy.
...long term effort to improve worldwide capabilities to deal with regional crisis.
...our national defense is effectively deterring conflict today, but it will require a sustained effort over a period of years to maintain these capabilities.

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
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